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ABSTRACT

COMMUNITY-SCALE BEACH NOURISHMENT AND GROIN
CONSTRUCTION DECISIONS ALONG HUMAN-MODIFIED COASTS:
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMICS, COORDINATION,
TOURISM, AND SHORELINE CHANGE
by Arye M. Janoff
In response to coastal erosion driven by storms, sea-level rise, and local gradients in
sediment supply, communities defend their homes and maintain beach recreation by
widening beaches via soft engineering (i.e., beach nourishment) or hard engineering (i.e.,
groins). Past research has found that, at regional scales, the net effect of these
interventions has in many cases not only counteracted historically observed beach
erosion, but has reversed erosional trends, on average shifting shorelines seaward. While
groins trap sediments locally at and upcoast of the structure relative to the direction of
alongshore transport, however, they often have adverse downcoast impacts, resulting in
heightened erosion and forcing communities to respond with new engineering measures
or by abandoning their beachfront properties. This research aims to understand the key
drivers of community-scale coastal management decisions. Toward this, I developed a
model that couples natural coastal dynamics (i.e., geomorphology) with the economics of
beach management, which is used to compare different protection schemes to determine
their economic consequences. In the first chapter, I explore the effect of inter-community
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beach nourishment coordination, and find that coordination is most important
economically for both communities when they have different property values because the
less wealthy town tends to nourish more than necessary if they preserve their beach
alone. In chapter two, I perform regression analyses with field data on community-scale
nourishment, socioeconomics, and geomorphic conditions in New Jersey, and find that
both a community’s beachfront wealth and its proportion of commercial property value
(i.e., a proxy for its level of tourism) help explain its beach nourishment decisions. In
chapter three, I employ the geomorphic-economic model in communities downdrift of a
groin subject to heightened beach erosion, and find that the community’s beachfront
property value and its size (a proxy for its tax base) help explain how (i.e., nourishment,
groin, both, or neither) and when it will respond. In a scenario in which climate change
causes shorelines to retreat more rapidly and the overexploitation of sand/rock resources
dramatically increases its cost, less wealthy communities may be unable to keep pace
with the changing conditions and instead abandon their properties altogether, leaving
only the wealthiest homeowners along the coast. Furthermore, tourism-centric
communities facing these threats may respond with different nourishment approaches to
meet recreational demand compared to their residential-dominated counterparts. Finally,
for communities subject to groin-induced erosion, it is possible that the historical
transition away from groins to beach nourishment as the main management response over
the last half century could be reversed in the future, and groins could again become the
more commonplace approach as communities adapt to sea-level rise. Such divergent
outcomes based upon wealth disparity, extent of a local tourism economy, and spatial
v

proximity to groin-induced erosion should be considered in future policy development at
the state and federal levels.
Keywords; coupled natural-human systems, coastal geomorphology, beach nourishment,
groin downdrift erosion, spatial-dynamic feedbacks, geo-economics, game theory, coastal
tourism, coastal management decisions.
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BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
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The New Jersey coast, spanning 127 miles from the northern barrier spit of Sandy
Hook and the eroding bluffs of Monmouth County, through the central and southern
barrier island complexes, to the headlands of Cape May is almost entirely developed with
boardwalks and beachfront communities (Ashley, 1986; Dahlgren, 1977; Newell et al.,
1988). Summers at the Jersey Shore have been a mainstay for tourists from all over the
state and world, touting some of the oldest seaside resorts in the country (Weiss, 2004).
From these seasonal crowds have emerged various cultural landmarks such as the Stone
Pony and Convention Hall in Asbury Park, Jenkinson’s Boardwalk in Point Pleasant
Beach, Casino Pier in Seaside Heights, Steel Pier and the Casino Industry in Atlantic
City, Lucy the Elephant in Margate City, Morey’s Pier and the tramcar in Wildwood, and
the Victorian-style bed and breakfasts and Congress Hall in Cape May (Rosenberg, 2019;
Simm, 2019).
These attractions and an increasing demand for beach vacation homes has led to
widespread infrastructural development (Crossett et al., 2004). Communities were settled
and incorporated to provide public services, and as the densely populated nearby urban
centers of New York City and Philadelphia continued to grow in the first half of the 20th
century, more people sought refuge from the urban heat in the cool sea breezes and in the
waves on the Jersey Shore (Capuzzo, 2003). Eventually, the coastal system became
heavily modified, with homes and promenades vying for the best ocean views lining the
former foredune environments. Storms and coastal erosion were unplanned for and
unmitigated, however, and rather than rethink these beachfront investments after
suffering significant property damages, many of New Jersey’s communities sought to
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protect their infrastructure through beach management, eventually requiring help from
the State and Federal governments (Psuty and Ofiara, 2002; USACE, 2012).
Over the last half-century, the scale of these human interventions has grown ever
larger, creating a unique and unknown system state: the urbanized coast. This effect,
coined the “new-jerseyization” of the shoreline by Orrin Pilkey (Pilkey and Neal, 1992),
describes a human-adapted system that behaves differently from its natural state, not only
due to the loss of various natural components such as the dune, marsh, and maritime
forest environments, but also due to the emergent feedbacks between the natural
dynamics and human interventions (Nordstrom, 1994; Nordstrom and Jackson, 1995).
Living close to the ocean serves as an amenity, creating the base for local and
tourist economies. There is an inherent desire to protect private and public infrastructure,
including properties, roads, boardwalks, water and gas lines, sewers, stormwater
infrastructure, communications systems, etc. (Johnston et al., 2014). Beaches and oceans
have high recreational values, providing public goods and services for surfers, kitesurfers, wind-surfers, swimmers, kayakers, scuba-divers, snorkelers, birders, sunbathers,
and others (Ariza et al., 2014; Sano et al., 2011). In addition, many coastal homeowners
conserve their properties for future generations, implying high bequest values (Silberman
et al., 1992). Without question, humans are attracted to coastal life.
Property owners and coastal managers have utilized soft and hard engineering to
protect properties and to sustain beach recreation (Douglass and Krolak, 2008; van Rijn,
2011). Soft engineering involves external sand placement, known as replenishment,
nourishment, or beach fill, to widen beaches artificially (Hoagland et al., 2012). This
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‘soft’ approach may require regular maintenance as sand spreads alongshore, however,
resulting in the need for periodic re-nourishment (Landry, 2004; Smith et al., 2009). Hard
engineering involves the construction of immovable objects, such as shore-perpendicular
groins, which slow alongshore currents to deposit sediments locally at and updrift of the
object (Kraus and Batten, 2007; Mestanza et al., 2018; Valsamidis and Reeve, 2017).
On aggregate, these practices have not only masked regional historical trends in
coastal erosion but also led to net shoreline accretion in developed areas along the U.S.
East and Gulf coasts, especially in New Jersey (Armstrong and Lazarus, 2019, Hapke et
al., 2013). These geomorphic consequences have, in turn, capitalized into the coastal real
estate market, which has necessitated further beach management (Armstrong et al.,
2016). Additionally, many high tourism zones such as Asbury Park, Long Branch, and
Seaside Heights have benefitted in recent years from extensive coastal zone management,
providing wider beaches for recreation and more investment in the hospitality and service
industries (Psuty and Ofiara, 2002).
Research on the outcomes of heavily developed coasts is still in its infancy and
the key drivers of these system dynamics are relatively unexplored. Moreover, the range
of feedbacks between private residential properties, commercial development, and natural
geomorphological changes along the coast requires a deeper understanding. This
dissertation will seek to address the interplay between the natural and human processes of
heavily developed coasts, and more fundamentally, to identify the main factors that might
help explain the cumulative evolution of such coupled systems.
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We focus these efforts on both hard (i.e., groins) and soft (i.e., beach
nourishment) engineering practices, on various community types (i.e., residentialdominated vs. commercial-dominated), and on different spatial scales (i.e., single
community vs. multi-community interactions). The research proposed in this dissertation
can be divided into three main objectives:

I.

Objective 1: Explore the role of coordination between neighboring communities
in how they choose their beach nourishment programs and the resultant
geomorphic and economic consequences of decisions made jointly vs.
independently

II.

Objective 2: Determine the interplay among socioeconomics, tourism, and
geomorphology to understand how commercial vs. residential development
controls community-scale beach nourishment decisions differently

III.

Objective 3: Couple geomorphology and socioeconomics to account for groin
downdrift erosion and explore the key parameters that govern downdrift
community responses in sediment-starved locations

Taken together, this work will help to describe how a coupled natural-human
system such as the New Jersey coast evolves over decadal to centennial timescales and on
sub-regional to regional space scales. This dissertation research will also add to the body
of knowledge on the dynamics of developed coasts with an array of human-scale
components and intervention types that until now have been unexplored. More broadly,
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this work will not only benefit our collective scientific understanding of coupled coastal
system dynamics, but will also help to inform local managers, state planners, multi-state
coalitions, federal policymakers, and flood insurance markets as we face more rapid sealevel-rise rates and changing sand resource economic conditions associated with climate
change in the future.
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CHAPTER 1 – FROM COASTAL RETREAT TO SEAWARD GROWTH:
EMERGENT BEHAVIORS FROM PAIRED COMMUNITY BEACH
NOURISHMENT CHOICES

The contents of this chapter appear in:
Janoff, A., Lorenzo-Trueba, J., Hoagland, P., Jin, D., & Ashton, A. D. (2020). From
Coastal Retreat to Seaward Growth: Emergent Behaviors from Paired Community Beach
Nourishment Choices. Earth and Space Science Open Archive ESSOAr.
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1.0 Summary
Coastal communities facing shoreline erosion preserve their beaches both for
recreation and for property protection. One approach is nourishment, the placement of
externally-sourced sand to increase the beach’s width, forming an ephemeral protrusion
that requires periodic re-nourishment. Nourishments add value to beachfront properties,
thereby affecting re-nourishment choices for an individual community. However, the
shoreline represents an alongshore-connected system, such that morphodynamics in one
community are influenced by actions in neighboring communities. Prior research
suggests coordinated nourishment decisions between neighbors were economically
optimal, though many real-world communities have failed to coordinate, and the
geomorphic consequences of which are unknown. Toward understanding this
geomorphic-economic relationship, we develop a coupled model representing two
neighboring communities and an adjacent non-managed shoreline. Within this
framework, we examine scenarios where communities coordinate nourishment choices to
maximize their joint net benefit versus scenarios where decision-making is uncoordinated
such that communities aim to maximize their independent net benefits. We examine how
community-scale property values affect choices produced by each management scheme
and the economic importance of coordinating. The geo-economic model produces four
behaviors based on nourishment frequency: seaward growth, hold the line, slow retreat,
and full retreat. Under current conditions, coordination is strongly beneficial for wealthasymmetric systems, where less wealthy communities acting alone risk nourishing more
than necessary relative to their optimal frequency under coordination. For a future
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scenario, with increased material costs and background erosion due to sea-level rise, less
wealthy communities might be unable to afford nourishing their beach independently and
thus lose their beachfront properties.

1.1 Introduction
Beach nourishment involves dredging sediment from external sources to deposit
locally in order to widen beaches (Hoagland et al., 2012; Lazarus et al., 2011; Smith et
al., 2009). As the predominant form of beach maintenance along the U.S. east coast since
the 1960’s, this practice has not only masked regional historical trends in coastal erosion
but also led to net shoreline accretion in developed areas along the U.S. East and Gulf
coasts, e.g. New York and New Jersey (Armstrong & Lazarus, 2019; Hapke et al., 2013).
While communities or groups of communities often nourish on a local scale, these sudden
increases in beach width are subject to heightened erosion due to alongshore and crossshore sediment transport, thereby diminishing the volume of sand placed by these
communities over time and thus, the efficiency (sand lost relative to the sand added) of
the nourishment project as well. When combined with neighboring actions, regional
nourishment comprises a dynamical system (Ells & Murray, 2012).
Aggregate shoreline trends do not always explain community-scale nourishment
choices, however. While many communities have widened their beaches since initiating
maintenance activities, some have held their shoreline position (Hapke et al., 2013). In
extreme cases, communities have lost individual properties or have abandoned entire
municipalities (Kobell, 2014; Tischler, 2006). This range of outcomes highlights the
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location-specific variability of beach nourishment decisions, potentially influenced by
underlying differences in geology and socioeconomics that affect the efficiency or
feasibility of nourishment projects, and necessitates a deeper analysis of the dynamic
processes by which communities and coastlines interact, accounting for both human and
natural components.
Previous work found a positive feedback between coastal development and
nourishment effort, whereby widened beaches add value to adjacent properties and
compel future beach nourishments (Armstrong et al., 2016; McNamara et al., 2015).
There is limited knowledge on what initially triggers this geomorphic-economic
feedback, and what role, if any, the distribution of alongshore wealth might play in this
feedback. Recent work has suggested that the level of coordination among coastal
neighbors could partially explain these emergent outcomes (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016;
Smith et al., 2015).
Many studies have explored the economic effects of coordinated vs. independent
behavior (Brandts & Schram, 2001; Cason & Gangadharan, 2015; Gachter et al., 2017;
Metzner et al., 2006), but research on its application to coastal dynamics is still in its
infancy. Empirical studies in behavioral economics use rule-based games to explore how
humans interact (Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1996). In one such example, a
public goods game, two players contribute toward a shared good, and enjoy that good
regardless of their contribution levels. Each player may choose not to contribute but still
enjoy the good, thus benefiting from the other player’s effort and maximizing self-utility.
Contributors who compare their payoff to the “free-rider” often react by giving less out of
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spite, resulting in an economically suboptimal outcome in subsequent rounds of the game
(Cason et al., 2004).
Beach nourishment interactions among coastal neighboring communities follow
these economic dynamics, including feedbacks between human “players” and their
natural environment. In response to geomorphic processes and background erosion,
coastal communities actively maintain their beaches to protect nearby properties and
infrastructure (Johnston et al., 2014), for recreational activities such as surfing,
swimming, or sunbathing (Lazarow, 2007; Wagner et al., 2011), for providing ecosystem
services including dune and intertidal habitats (Landry & Whitehead, 2015; Pompe &
Rinehart, 1995), and for supporting local tourism economies (King, 1999).
Properties adjacent to the beach capitalize these services into their value. A small
but growing literature on hedonic pricing has shown that property owners benefit
economically from local beach widening due to human intervention (Gopalakrishnan et
al., 2011; Landry & Hindsley, 2011; Pompe & Rinehart, 1995). Ocean currents driven by
waves redistribute this sand along the coast between neighboring communities, implying
that beach nourishment is a quasi-public good where down flow communities cannot be
excluded. Where communities border natural coast, tidal inlets, or other sinks for
nourishment sand, these currents might also reduce the physical efficiency of
nourishment projects by removing sand from the active beach system. Using a simplified
game-theoretic framework, we explored how socioeconomic relationships drive
nourishment decisions and how these management outcomes and their corresponding
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nourishment efficiencies might differ if communities coordinate their beach maintenance
programs or choose strategies independently.
Historically, coastal communities have not coordinated their nourishment plans
(Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016; Lazarus et al., 2011). Records of past beach maintenance
projects indicate that local governments and private sponsors fund many such projects,
most of which have occurred in New Jersey and Florida (Pilkey & Clayton, 1989; PSDS,
2019). One example is Ocean City, NJ, which pumped sand onto its beaches more than
30 times between 1952 and 1982 using city funds and a city-owned dredge (Pilkey &
Clayton, 1987). Similarly, Captiva Island, FL states on their Erosion Prevention District
website, “(the) residents and businesses on Captiva Island have successfully managed
their beaches for over 50 years” (Captiva Erosion Prevention District, 2020).
This decentralized behavior often has both local and non-local effects (Beasley &
Dundas, 2018; Ells & Murray, 2012; Goodrow & Procopio, 2018; Hillyer, 1996), and
Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016) suggest this has resulted in narrower beaches due to the
effort-reducing feedback described earlier, leading to an economically suboptimal
outcome to alongshore coordination. In other words, cooperation amongst communities
represents their economically optimal solution. Further, there is no incentive for
communities acting alone to increase their nourishment effort because doing so would
mean they would lose more sand from their beach due to the higher angle formed by their
seaward protrusion, effectively reducing their nourishment project’s physical efficiency
as well. These historically uncoordinated beach nourishments may have caused
accidental geoengineering of the coastal system that differs from the natural dynamics
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resulting in narrower beaches (Smith et al., 2015). Indeed, Armstrong et al. (2019) and
Hapke et al. (2013) detected this anthropogenic signature, finding that beaches along the
US east coast have accreted seaward since beach nourishment began in earnest in the
1960s.
While anecdotal evidence indicates that communities have exhibited
uncoordinated behavior, intuition from game theory and past research would suggest that
this behavior results in narrower beaches. Yet, the outcome of widened beaches is both
observable and quantifiable; which suggests the question: is uncoordinated or coordinated
beach nourishment the cause of this coastal-anthropic signature? Perhaps it is not
mutually exclusive but depends on certain conditions. If so, what are the underlying
conditions that drive cooperation?
In this paper, we construct an idealized modeling framework that couples crossshore and alongshore geodynamics with changes in coastal property values, and we
explore how community-scale economic characteristics control beach nourishment
decisions. We speculate that the property value distribution between coastal neighbors
determines the importance of coordinating nourishment plans, and that alongshore wealth
asymmetry could control the emergent system behaviors. These differences could explain
the broad array of outcomes along the U.S. East and Gulf coasts, ranging from seaward
growth to retreating shorelines, and they could provide insight into the key drivers of past
coastal behavior.
It will be especially important to understand the future evolution of these heavily
developed coasts under different coordination schemes when faced with more extreme
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conditions, including more rapid sea-level-rise rates and higher sand resource costs for
completing beach nourishment projects. Exploring how these future changes might affect
community- and regional-scale behaviors using our geo-economic framework could help
address these knowledge gaps, and inform coastal policymakers and managers dealing
with unique challenges associated with global climate change.

1.2 Mathematical Framework
We explore beach nourishment decisions for two alongshore-neighboring
communities with an idealized geometry as depicted in Figure 1.1. The model domain
includes neighboring communities i=1,2 that can nourish and an alongshore-adjacent
boundary region i=3 that cannot nourish, each with alongshore length si. Each
community has an average shoreline location xS,i and shoreface toe location xT,i. The
geometric relationship comprising these boundaries along with the depth of closure
(shoreface depth) D form the shoreface slope θi:
𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑥𝑥

𝐷𝐷

𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)−𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)

.

(1.1)

The property setback xH,i delineates the community’s seaward limit, and along with its
shoreline, bounds the community’s beach width wi, i.e., wi = xS,i – xH,i. Given this
idealized geometry, we can describe the system with two state variables per alongshore
community: the location of the shoreline xS,i and the shoreface toe xT,i.
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Figure 1.1. (a) Model setup planview, (b) cross-section illustrating beach nourishment,
and (c) the alongshore and (d) the cross-shore transport that occurs due to this seaward
protrusion.
To describe the dynamics of this system, we account for both natural processes,
including cross-shore and alongshore sediment transport, and human processes, including
beach nourishment practices. Communities respond to a background erosion rate γ by
nourishing their beaches with a fixed nourishment width xN,i, with the human intervention
thus forming a shoreline protrusion. A low-angle wave climate flattens these beach
nourishments via natural processes. Alongshore sediment flux qL,i is directed from
seaward-relative communities to landward-relative communities, with an alongshore
distance between communities (si + si+1)/2. We highlight a representative example of the
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flux direction between communities in Figure 1, but in theory the alongshore transport
can occur in either direction depending on the shoreline’s configuration.
The boundary cell represents a natural coastline in which no nourishment occurs.
A periodic boundary condition at the edges of the system domain means that any
sediment leaving the system at one boundary re-enters at the other boundary. When one
or both communities nourish, sediment from these protrusions transports alongshore from
the communities to the boundary cell, which therefore serves as a sediment sink for
nourishment sand. Nourishment events at the shoreline also trigger cross-shore sediment
flux qC,i due to the over-steepened shoreface slope, directing sand from the shoreline to
the shoreface toe. The balance between the volume of nourishment sand and the sand lost
alongshore to the boundary cell, cross-shore to the toe, or removed from the system due
to background erosion determine the physical efficiency of the nourishment project.
A two-community system with a boundary cell is analyzed here. The governing
equations are presented in general form allowing an extension to n communities. We
characterize the geometry of each community (and the adjacent boundary coast) with the
average shoreline location xS,i and shoreface toe xT,i, which allows us to describe the
evolution of the system using six ordinary differential equations.
We present these geodynamics in the first section below, followed by the
coupling between physical processes and community behaviors. We then discuss the
control problem by which communities choose nourishment actions, and we propose a
numerical solution to this problem.
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1.2.1 Beach and Shoreface Morphodynamics
We compute the alongshore-averaged component of sediment flux qL,i using the
difference in average shoreline locations xs,i – xs,i+1 between neighboring communities i
and i+1:
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾1 ∙

�𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)−𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖+1 (𝑡𝑡)�
(𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 +𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖+1 )/2

,

(1.2)

where K1 is the alongshore flux coefficient. This equation, which assumes the low-waveangle case for a standard CERC formula (Coastal Engineering Research Center, 1984),
represents an average alongshore flux between each community based on the angle
formed by the two shoreline locations. This shoreline angle controls both the magnitude
and the direction of alongshore sediment transport, given by equation 1.2.
Widening a beach via nourishment steepens the beach’s slope (i.e., shoreface)
relative to its equilibrium profile (Dean, 1977, 1991; Miselis & Lorenzo-Trueba, 2017),
which triggers cross-shore sediment transport. The shoreface flux qC,i is the cross-shore
component of sediment transport based on its slope θi relative to its equilibrium profile
θeq:
𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝐾𝐾2 ∙ �𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) − 𝜃𝜃𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �,

where K2 is the shoreface flux coefficient. When the shoreface is steeper than its
equilibrium profile (i.e., θi > θeq), sand moves from the upper shoreface to the lower
shoreface, whereas the opposite is true if the shoreface has a milder slope than its
equilibrium profile (i.e., θi < θeq).

(1.3)
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Changes in shoreline position xS,i are computed using the discretized ordinary
differential equation Δxs,i/Δt for each cell:
∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
∆𝑡𝑡

=

2 ∙ �𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑡𝑡)−𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)�
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖

−

4∙𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝐷𝐷

− 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 �𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 , 𝑅𝑅� ,

(1.4)

where qL,i and qC,i are given by equations (1.2) and (1.3) 1. The nourishment term Ni is a
function representing intermittent nourishment with a fixed cross-shore width xN,i and
rotation length Ri (time interval between periodic nourishment) (Smith et al., 2009).
We assume the nourishment function Ni to be discrete in order to capture the
time-specific costs of each sand placement. Nourishment events occur when the time
function equals a multiple j of the rotation length Ri with a subsequent cross-shore
magnitude xN,i:
𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ∗ (𝑡𝑡, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ) = �

𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 ;

ℎ

𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ∙ ∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝑗𝑗
,
0;
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(1.5)

where hi is the number of nourishment episodes per community. We only apply the
nourishment term Ni in equation 1.4 for interior communities who nourish. The term Ni is
set to zero in the boundary cell i = 3, which represents a natural nearby coastline.

The ordinary differential equation for the shoreline location is based on previous work that has tested the
effect of alongshore (Ashton et al., 2006a, 2006b) and cross-shore (Dean, 1977, 1991) dynamics on
shoreline changes using field observations. Given that this framework assumes both alongshore and crossshore mass balance, the numerical solution is grounded in the principles of physics as employed in previous
literature (Falqués, 2003; Williams et al., 2013). Finally, the numerical solution for the shoreline was also
validated using the analytical solution for a simplified version of this ordinary differential equation for one
community (see Kraus and Batten, 2007), and the two solutions were found to be in agreement.
1
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A second discretized ordinary differential equation ΔxT,i/Δt simulates the
evolution of the shoreface toe location xT,i as a function of the cross-shore sediment flux
qC,i, the shoreface depth D, and the background erosion rate γ:
∆𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
∆𝑡𝑡

=

4∙𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝐷𝐷

− 𝛾𝛾.

(1.6)

These geodynamics can then be used to describe the physical efficiency of the
nourishment projects, or in other words, the volume of sand retained in the beach system
relative to the volume of sand pumped onto the beach via nourishment activities. We
track the volume of sediment lost from the nourishment projects qLoss in both
communities based on the cross-shore flux qC, the alongshore flux qL and the background
erosion rate γ:
𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑡𝑡) = (𝑠𝑠1 + 𝑠𝑠2 ) ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝛾𝛾 + 4 ∙ �𝑠𝑠1 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,1 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝑠𝑠2 ∙ 𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,2 (𝑡𝑡)� + 2 ∙ 𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇 ∙

�𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,3 (𝑡𝑡) − 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,2 (𝑡𝑡)�.

(1.7)

The total volume of sand lost over the course of a model run VLoss is the integration of this
qLoss through time:
𝑡𝑡

𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 = ∫0 𝑓𝑓 𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑,

(1.8)

where tf is the planning time horizon.
The total volume of sand added by the nourishment projects VNourish is the discrete
sum of all nourishment volumes based on the cross-shore project widths xN,1 and xN,2, and
the rotation lengths R1 and R2 in communities one and two:
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𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ =

𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇
2

𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 ∙𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁,1 ∙𝑠𝑠1

∙�

𝑅𝑅1

+

𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 ∙𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁,2 ∙𝑠𝑠2
𝑅𝑅2

�.

(1.9)

The efficiency of the nourishment project E can then be determined by the
balance between the volume nourished VNourish and the volume lost VLoss:
𝐸𝐸 = 𝑉𝑉

𝑉𝑉𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁ℎ +𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

.

(1.10)

1.2.2 Economic Model
The system’s physical components feed into a socioeconomic framework used to
compare the outcomes of different nourishment choices (i.e., rotation lengths). Toward
this end, beaches are assumed to provide both protective and recreational benefits for
coastal communities (Jin et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2003; McNamara & Keeler, 2013;
McNamara et al., 2015; Pompe & Rinehart, 1995, Simmons et al., 2002). When
analyzing the benefit for the whole community, we assume that an average beach width
borders all beachfront homes in the community with an average property value. We
assume that each community is the relevant decision-maker.
The value of beach width wi is capitalized into the benefit function Bi for
community i as:
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) 𝛽𝛽

𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜌𝜌 ∙ �

𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼

� ,

(1.11)

where αi is the baseline property value that includes all of a home’s amenities except for
that of the beach’s width (i.e., the number of bedrooms/bathrooms, square footage, lot
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acreage, etc.) as well as the number of alongshore properties per community, ρ is the
discount rate that weights future vs. present values and can be interpreted here as the
capitalization rate through time, and wα is the baseline width beyond which the beach
adds value to the front property.
Note that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜌𝜌 is the baseline rental value or capital added per unit time for the

average home in community i. The positive parameter β describes the effects on Bi of unit
changes in beach width. The sum of all property values in a community represents the
community’s total wealth. Assuming each community has the same number of homes, the
difference in average property value reflects the difference in total wealth between
neighboring communities. This relationship, therefore, captures how beach
morphodynamic processes affect a community’s level of wealth.
In addition to the benefits of widening a beach, communities incur a cost for their
nourishment project Ci based on the fixed cost cf (for permitting, equipment, labor, etc.)
and the variable cost ϕN (i.e., volumetric price of sand resource):
1

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁 ∙ 2 ∙ 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝐷 ∙ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ,

(1.12)

where nourishment volume is a triangular prism formed by the cross-shore width xN,i, the
depth of closure D, and the alongshore project length si (Figure 1.1). Non-nourishing
communities do not incur any costs, i.e., Ci = 0.
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1.2.3 Optimization: Nourishment Rotation Length for Coordination and NonCoordination
We define the net benefit NBi as the sum of continuous benefits Bi (Equation
1.11) and discrete costs Ci (Equation 1.12) discounted by a representative rate ρ over a
planning time horizon tf:
𝑡𝑡

ℎ

𝐶𝐶 (𝑡𝑡)

𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = ∫0 𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑒𝑒 −𝜌𝜌∙𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − ∑𝑗𝑗=1
.
(1+𝜌𝜌)𝑡𝑡

(1.13)

We simulate two levels of coordination: jointly optimized rotation lengths
(coordination), and independently optimized rotation lengths (non-coordination). Under
non-coordination, each community i independently maximizes its net benefits NBi as
follows:
max 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 .
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖

(1.14)

We explore two end-member assumptions and present one as a representative
decentralized case. For one end member scenario, a community choosing its nourishment
strategy independently assumes its neighbor will not nourish, which is a cautionary
assumption. This might cause the community to nourish more frequently than necessary
and may be suboptimal, but at least the community can avoid under-nourishing its beach
and potentially losing beachfront properties. While this assumes that communities cannot
observe what their neighbor is doing, which represents a limited setup that simplifies the
problem of non-cooperation, we use this scenario as a baseline analysis because it is the
most conservative assumption a community can make. For the other end member
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scenario, a community assumes its neighbor will nourish with high frequency, which is a
risky assumption because it could lead to more instances of beachfront property loss. The
risky end member is included in the chapter 1 appendix.
Under coordination, both communities share their management decision by
choosing the optimal rotation lengths that maximize the sum of their net benefits:
max ∑2𝑖𝑖=1 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅1 ,𝑅𝑅2

(1.15)

Coordination implies both communities have full information about their neighbor’s
behavior, and thus represents the socially optimal solution. There are cases in which
communities might find it individually net beneficial to deviate from their socially
optimal solution, however, unless a cost-sharing arrangement exists.
In all cases, communities commit to the nourishment rotation lengths yielded by
equations (1.14) or (1.15) until the end of the model run, similar to a real-world
community’s contractual obligation to a dredge company for a fixed period (USACE,
1999). This represents a one-time decision in our framework. While this approach does
not allow for dynamic feedbacks between communities through time, this simplifies a
difficult problem into a basic decision framework, describing how communities might
choose their nourishment strategies initially, and how these first moves might differ
based on their coordination scheme.
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1.2.4 Numerical Solution
In this section, we explain how we numerically solve the optimization problem
described in equations (1.14) and (1.15). First, we compute the evolution of the shoreline
location xS and shoreface toe xT in each community for a wide range of nourishment
rotation lengths between 0-25 years with a spacing of 0.2 years. In particular, we obtain
xS and xT from equations (1.4) and (1.6) respectively, which we solve numerically using
the simplified forward Euler method 2. We then calculate the benefits and costs for each
scenario using equations (1.11) and (1.12) respectively. The discounted difference
between the benefits and costs yields the net benefit, which we compare between all
options. The rotation lengths R1* and R2* provide the maximum net benefit under each
scenario (i.e., non-coordination and coordination). All results presented below ensure that
neither the resolution nor the boundary limits employed misrepresent the true optimal
choice.

The Forward Euler method for the numerical solution is employed here because it is the simplest
approach, which is appropriate for the set of first order differential equations with given initial values. In
addition, the Forward Euler method was verified using the Modified Euler and the Runge-Kutta methods,
all of which returned similar results for the system’s dynamics. Finally, the Forward Euler was tested with
various model time steps, which did not produce any appreciable differences.

2
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1.2.5 Parameter Estimation
Table 1.1. Economic Input Parameters for Model Simulations
Economic
Symbol Feasible Units
Test value: Test value: figs.
Parameters
range
figs. 2, 5-6,
9-10
8
of values
Variable
ϕN
Nourishment
Costa,b,e,i,m,p,t

5—30

$/m

Fixed
cf
Nourishment
Costd,j,p

-

Baseline
Property

-

α

3

15

15—50

$1,000,000

1

1

$1,000

25—550

Community 1:
$385

c,f,h,k,n,r,u

Value

Community 2:
$257
Discount
Rateg,q,s,t

ρ

Hedonic
β
Parameter
(Beach
Width)b,d,l,o,q

1—10

%/yr

0.05—0.8 -

6

6

0.4

0.4

Sources. aASBPA (2020). bGopalakrishnan (2010). cGopalakrishnan et al. (2011).
d
Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016). eHillyer (1996). fJin et al. (2015). gLandry (2004). hLandry
and Hindsley (2011). iMcdowell Peek et al. (2016). jMcNamara et al. (2011). kNational
Association of REALTORS (2020). lPompe and Rinehart (1995). mPSDS (2019). nRedfin
Inc. (2020). oSlott (2008). pSlott et al. (2010). qSmith et al. (2009). rTrulia LLC. (2020).
s
USACE (1999). tWilliams et al. (2013). uZillow Inc. (2020).
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Table 1.2. Physical Input Parameters for Model Simulations
Physical
Symb Feasible Units Test
Test value:
Parameters
ol
range of
value: fig. 7
Values
figs.
2, 56, 8a
Background γ
0—10
m/yr 5
5
Erosion
Ratea,i,k,r,v,w
Nourishment xN
0—200
m
50
100
Magnitudeb,t
Rotation
R
yr
0—
(g)
Lengthb,o,t,u
25
R1=6.38
R2=11.86
(h)
R1=6.92
R2=7.55
Depth of
D
5—20
m
16
16
Closuref,g,j,m,n

Test
Test value:
value: figs. 9-10
fig.
8b
5

5—10

50

50

0—
25

0—25

16

16

,s

Alongshore
K1
Flux
Coefficientc,d,

10—
1,000

1,000
m2/yr

600

600

600

600

Cross-shore
Flux
Coefficientp,q

K2

-

m2/yr

2,000

2,000

2,000

2,000

Shoreface
Equilibrium
Slopep,q,s
Alongshore
Community
Length (Cell
Length)l

θeq

-

m/m

0.02

0.02

0.02

0.02

-

m

1,500

e,h

,s

(g)
10,00 1,500
s1=7090
0
s2=3670
s3=5380
(h)
s1=2720
s2=7780
s3=5250
Sources: aArmstrong and Lazarus (2019). bASBPA (2020). cAshton et al. (2001).
d
Ashton and Murray (2006a). eAshton and Murray (2006b). fBirkemeier (1985).
g
Brutsché et al. (2014). hFalqués (2003). iGopalakrishnan (2010). jHallermeier (1980).
k
Hapke et al. (2013). lInspired by field values observed in New Jersey. mKraus and Batten
s
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(2007). nKraus et al. (1995). oLazarus et al. (2011). pLorenzo-Trueba and Ashton (2014).
q
Miselis and Lorenzo-Trueba (2017). rMurray et al. (2013). sOrtiz and Ashton (2016).
t
PSDS (2019). uSmith et al. (2009). vWilliams et al. (2013). wZhang et al. (2004).
1.3 Community Behaviors
1.3.1 Single Community
The model produces four primary behaviors based on nourishment choices:
seaward growth due to frequent beach nourishment (i.e., short rotation length); hold the
line due to moderately frequent nourishment (i.e., medium rotation length); slow retreat
due to infrequent nourishment (i.e., long rotation length) and resulting in property
abandonment; and full retreat due to a lack of nourishment and resulting in property
abandonment (Figure 1.2). We characterize seaward growth behavior as the maximum
shoreline position in the final five years greater than the maximum seaward extent of the
first nourishment event. Hold the line behavior falls between this threshold and the initial
property setback. Whereas, slow retreat and full retreat result in shorelines landward of
the initial property setback. The only difference between the latter two scenarios is that
slow retreat includes nourishment effort on the part of the community and full retreat
does not (Figure 1.2). When considering two communities, each behavioral category that
includes beach nourishment can comprise a mix of two primary behaviors.
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Figure 1.2. Mode behaviors resulting from different beach nourishment frequencies: a)
R=3 years b) R=5.2 years c) R=10 years d) R=Ø (no nourishment).

We present an example of each mode behavior observed in the field. Using the
beach nourishment databases from the Program for the Study of Developed Shorelines
(PSDS) of Western Carolina University (2019) and the American Shore and Beach
Preservation Association (ASBPA, 2020), we report the number of nourishment events
and year of first/last nourishment event for each example below and show that these
mode behaviors likely depend on nourishment decisions (Figure 1.3a-d).
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Figure 1.3. Emergent mode behaviors observed in the United States East and Gulf coasts:
(a) seaward growth in Ocean City, NJ; (b) hold the line in Brigantine, NJ; (c) slow retreat
in Dauphin Island, AL; and (d) full retreat in Cedar Island, VA.

Toward coupling these nourishment decisions and their emergent mode behaviors
with community-scale socioeconomics, we present the rotation lengths for coastal New

30

Jersey communities as a function of their property values (Figure 1.4). We determine a
median property value estimate using four real estate search engines (National
Association of REALTORS, 2020; Redfin Inc., 2020; Trulia LLC., 2020; Zillow Inc.,
2020), and calculate the representative beachfront property value assuming a power law
relationship between property value and inland distance from the ocean (Gopalakrishnan
et al., 2011; Pompe & Rinehart, 1995). We gather data using spatial analyst tools on
alongshore community lengths and representative property sizes. The total wealth of the
community is defined here as the summed value of all alongshore properties in a
community. We track the number of nourishment events by community, as reported in
the PSDS (2019) and the ASBPA (2020) databases, and use the first (1936) and last
(2020) completed nourishment event along the New Jersey coast to calculate a
representative rotation length for each community.
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Figure 1.4. Rotation lengths for coastal communities in New Jersey as a function of their
total beachfront wealth (alongshore sum of beachfront property values), exhibiting
nourishment variability for low-wealth communities and frequent nourishment for highwealth communities.

While in general, the rotation length decreases as total beachfront wealth
increases, there is variability for low-wealth communities. This could be due to
commercial real estate exerting control over nourishment frequency (e.g. Atlantic City,
Ocean City, Asbury Park, Cape May, Wildwood, Long Branch, etc.), where beach
tourism economies are often located in neighborhoods with lower property values (or
there is a disamenity associated with proximity to tourism areas). Other variability,
however, could be due to alongshore interactions between neighboring communities’
nourishment decisions.
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In many field cases, mode behaviors realized by a community depend at least in
part on their neighbor’s actions as well. We account for this alongshore coupling between
neighboring nourishment choices in the subsequent section (1.3.2). However, these initial
field insights do provide context for our beach nourishment game concerning the range of
both property values and rotation lengths used for model explorations.

1.3.2 Two-community Interconnection
In order to capture the alongshore feedbacks between neighboring community
nourishment decisions, a two-community model setup was implemented, allowing a
comparison of the emergent behaviors produced by coordinated and uncoordinated
schemes. The setup comprises a sample array of real-world scenarios in which
neighboring communities can be wealth-symmetric or wealth-asymmetric (Figure 1.5).
The sensitivity of community nourishment decisions to different baseline property values
(Equation 1.7) in each community was explored.
Under coordination, community-specific rotation lengths depend on relative
baseline property value balances, but under non-coordination, they depend only on each
community’s baseline property value (Figure 1.5a-b). This baseline property value
regime space encompasses all key behaviors that emerge from the model (Figure 1.2)
including instances of mixed behaviors (i.e., seaward growth/hold the line). The
thresholds between these behaviors depend upon the level of coordination, and these
thresholds demarcate regions in which communities that do not coordinate misallocate
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their distribution of nourishment effort (rotation length) compared to their economically
optimal distribution of effort produced by coordination. This emerges, in particular, when
there is a disparity in baseline property values between neighbors (Figure 1.5a-b).
Full retreat arises for the lowest wealth systems regardless of whether or not
coordination occurs. Both coordinated and uncoordinated emergent behaviors are
sensitive to minor changes in baseline property values for low and moderately wealthy
systems, while they are less sensitive for high baseline property values. Neighboring
communities with different baseline property values experience many instances of
behavioral difference between coordinated and uncoordinated regimes, particularly for
moderate baseline property values. By working independently, communities effectively
treat all of their neighbors equally; thereby, ignoring the marginal importance of helping
a neighbor based on the benefit they might provide the system. Accounting for the
alongshore distribution of wealth under coordination represents the economically optimal
allocation of nourishment effort, contrasting with the uncoordinated scenario in which
communities might either under-nourish (i.e., longer rotation lengths) or over-nourish
(i.e., shorter rotation lengths) compared to their rotation length choices under coordinated
efforts (Figure 1.5a-b, e).
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Figure 1.5. Emergent behaviors for coupled systems under (a) coordination and (b) noncoordination and (c-d) the nourishment efficiencies under the respective management
schemes. Panel (e), the benefit of coordination relative to non-coordination indicates the
economic difference between management scenarios, and the community-specific regions
of over- and under-nourishment for (f) community one and (g) community two reveals
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how uncoordinated strategies economically compare with their optimal strategies under
coordination.
In general, nourishment efficiency increases as the wealth increases
corresponding with decreasing rotation lengths (Figure 1.5c-d). While this increase in
efficiency can be attributed in part to the larger volume of sand placed by frequent
nourishment (Equation 1.9), triggering an increase in the volume of sand lost from the
two communities (Equation 1.8), the fraction of volume lost relative to the nourishment
volume decreases and the efficiency thus increases (Equation 1.10). These efficiencies
differ between coordination schemes primarily in regions of wealth disparity, where
coordination results in a higher physical efficiency than non-coordination (Figure 1.5c-d),
corresponding with a higher economic efficiency (i.e. optimal solution) produced by
coordination in this region as well.
The difference in behavioral outcomes depending on the coordination level
highlights the baseline-property-value combinations for which coordination is most
important. The benefit of coordination is the smallest (i.e., coordination is least
important) for low wealth communities that cannot afford nourishment regardless of their
coordination level (Figure 5e). It is also lowest for regions of high wealth disparity
between neighbors because the marginal benefits provided by wide beaches in a wealthy
community outweigh the marginal costs of frequent nourishment, and their less wealthy
neighbor can neither afford nourishment on their own nor provide any appreciable benefit
to the system if they work together.
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The benefit of coordination is largest (i.e., coordination is most important) for
lower-wealth communities that can afford beach nourishment by cooperating but not by
acting alone. Coordination is also important for regions with moderate baseline-propertyvalue asymmetry, identified by the blue star as an example (Figure 1.5e). This baselineproperty-value combination corresponds with seaward growth behavior for both
coordination levels (Figure 1.5a-b), but coordination is more beneficial to the two
communities as a whole, assuming that a cost-sharing arrangement or transfer payment
exists under coordination, because the less wealthy community over-nourishes and the
wealthier community under-nourishes when acting alone (Figure 1.5f-g). This
uncoordinated distribution of nourishment effort between the two communities results in
a lower nourishment efficiency compared to coordination, meaning that the two
communities lose more sand from their beaches relative to the amount they place if they
neglect cooperation.
The optimal distribution of nourishment effort between communities for the blue
star in figure (1.5e) under coordination, while representing the maximum total net benefit
for the entire system, results in an asymmetric share in net benefits between communities
(Figure 1.6). In fact, the less wealthy community that nourishes infrequently under
coordination receives a larger share of the net benefits than the wealthier community that
nourishes frequently (Figure 1.6a). This is due to the large asymmetry in nourishment
effort, whereby the wealthier community bears the majority of the nourishment
responsibility, and is a function of the level of interconnectivity between communities
(i.e., that small alongshore length and the high diffusivity value). In regions where
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communities are more alongshore disconnected, the distributed nourishment effort and
thus the corresponding community-specific breakdown in net benefits might be more
comparable. A cost-sharing or transfer payment arrangement from the community
nourishing less might be necessary here to ensure the wealthier community remains in a
coordinated scheme.

Figure 1.6. Beach widths for communities with baseline property values corresponding to
the blue star in figure 1.5e under (a) coordination and (b) non-coordination, and (c-d) the
resulting community-specific net benefits for coordination and non-coordination
respectively.
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If these two communities compare their own payoffs resulting from each
coordination level rather than the total net benefit, however, there is an incentive for the
less wealthy community to cooperate (i.e., to follow their coordinated nourishment
choice) while there is an incentive for the wealthier community to defect (i.e., to follow
their uncoordinated nourishment choice) (Figure 1.6c-d). The wealthier community
realizes a higher net benefit from acting alone than coordinating because they not only
nourish less and incur fewer costs, but their less wealthy neighbor nourishes more than
they would have under the coordinated plan (Figure 1.6a-b). This combination of
strategies, if followed, would result in reduced nourishment effort system-wide, which
would lead to the suboptimal outcome of narrower beaches due to non-coordination as
described by Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016). These individual incentives, in the absence of
a cost sharing or transfer payment plan, might be a barrier to coordination, which could
help explain why communities have historically operated in a decentralized manner.

1.4 Model Comparison with Field Decisions
While the historical level of coordination between real-world communities and
their initial property values is unknown, we do see evidence of these two-community
mode behaviors in the field. Specifically, we highlight two barrier island systems in
southern New Jersey: Avalon/Stone Harbor and Strathmere/Sea Isle City. In both
instances, the two communities experience seaward growth behavior due to their
distributed nourishment effort. This evolution is evident both in historical aerial imagery
(Figure 1.7a-d) and in the modeled shorelines (Figure 1.7e-f).
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Figure 1.7. Example of dynamic interconnection between neighboring New Jersey
communities: (a) Avalon and Stone Harbor and (b) Strathmere (Upper Township) and
Sea Isle City. Historical aerial imagery from (a-b) 1920 and (c-d) 2019 illustrate their
developmental and morphodynamic evolution. From the PSDS and ASBPA beach
nourishment databases, we calculate each community’s rotation length, from which
seaward growth behavior emerges for (e-f) both barrier island systems.

We group two-community neighbors for all New Jersey community pairs in our
database and analyze their distributed nourishment choices (i.e., rotation length ratio) as a
function of their distributed beachfront wealth (i.e., wealth ratio). Here, the beachfront
wealth is defined as the sum of all beachfront property values in a community, which
accounts for the community’s alongshore length and number of properties adjacent to its
beachfront. Some field community pairs result in a rotation ratio that is larger than one,
meaning the less wealthy community nourishes more than the wealthier community
nourishes. We find that the commercial real estate influences associated with high
tourism areas such as Seaside Heights and Atlantic City could bias these examples.
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Similarly, the natural dynamics of shorelines adjacent to fully hardened (i.e. two jetties)
tidal inlets and the resultant sediment deficits downdrift of these inlet jetties, for which
our model does not account, could be affecting nourishment decisions in communities
such as Avon-by-the-Sea and Barnegat Light. For these reasons, we remove the field
pairs composed of these communities.
We plot the rotation-length ratios as a function of wealth ratios (relative to the
lower-wealth community for each two-community pair) for coordinated and
uncoordinated model scenarios and shade each region surrounding the corresponding
observations, terming these regions the coordinated and uncoordinated model envelopes.
These field-model comparisons include both small communities (Figure 1.8a) and large
communities (Figure 1.8b) to cover most New Jersey community sizes. In general,
increasing the wealth ratio results in a decreasing rotation-length ratio because when
neighboring communities have more wealth disparities (i.e., large wealth ratios) their
rotation lengths are more dissimilar (i.e., small rotation-length ratio). If neighboring
communities have high wealth disparities but similar rotation lengths, this may indicate
that they are misallocating their distributed nourishment effort compared to their
economically optimal levels.
The slope of this decreasing rotation ratio for small wealth ratios is steeper under
coordination than non-coordination for smaller communities, and the rotation ratios are
small for large wealth ratios under coordination (Figure 1.8a), meaning that nourishment
decisions are more different between the two communities when they coordinate and
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more similar between the two communities when they act independently. We then
overlay field data from neighboring New Jersey communities to see how two-community
pair decisions might compare with the model’s output. Given that many field
communities have alongshore lengths (median length = 2.68 km) similar to the case
presented in Figure 8a, the regions enveloping field pairs in this subplot might serve as an
indicator of their underlying decision-making scheme, i.e., whether or not they
coordinated their nourishment plans. An example of non-coordination could include Sea
Isle City/Avalon, NJ, which is plausible given they are on different barrier islands and
separated by a partially hardened (i.e., one jetty) tidal inlet. Whereas, Loveladies/Harvey
Cedars could be an example of coordination given they are tightly coupled alongshore
and subject to the same USACE regional beach nourishment plan (1999).
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Figure 1.8. Comparison of rotation-length ratio vs. wealth ratio between model
(coordination/non-coordination) and field observations for (a) small communities and (b)
large communities. Field pair locations identified by the abbreviations used in subplots ab are shown for the (c) central and (d) southern New Jersey coast regions.

Field examples that do not fall in either model envelope in figure (1.8a) could be
influenced by other underlying factors. One such factor could be the shoreline orientation
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effects whereby one community protrudes farther seaward than its landward neighbor
thus necessitating more frequent nourishment than expected due to its reduced
nourishment efficiency (e.g. Stone Harbor/North Wildwood). Another factor could be an
asymmetry in how the neighboring communities value their beach for recreational
purposes where wealthier communities value these amenities less than poorer
communities do (e.g. Deal/Asbury Park and Monmouth Beach/Long Branch). This
relates to the beach amenity value β in equation (1.11). Such factors are not considered
here, although future work will be necessary to explore these dynamics further.
A simple test within the model’s framework, however, is increasing the
alongshore community length (Figure 1.8b). This serves to reduce the connectivity
between communities and results in nourishment decisions that are less dependent on the
dynamics of neighboring communities. The coordinated scheme for large communities,
especially, yields rotation lengths that are more similar (i.e., rotation ratio that is closer to
one) than the same scheme for smaller communities. The model envelopes for large
communities (Figure 1.8b) cover nearly all remaining data points not covered by the
model envelopes for small communities (Figure 8a), including larger field communities
such as Long Branch (length = 6.95 km). One data point that remains uncovered by the
large community envelopes, Ocean City/Longport, could be a result of the disparity in
community lengths (Ocean City = 11.47 km; Longport = 2.27 km) or their separation by
a large tidal inlet (Great Egg Harbor Inlet) that is partially hardened, which could be
disrupting alongshore flow between communities.
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Furthermore, when we include community-average nourishment volumes as well
as frequencies in our analysis, presented below as nourishment flux, we find that
community pairs might be allocating their nourishment effort in an economically
inefficient manner. For instance, in figure 9a, poorer communities in a moderate wealthdisparate pair tend to nourish with larger fluxes than wealthier neighbors do, on average,
indicating that these poorer communities are likely over-nourishing or that their wealthier
neighbors are under-nourishing compared to their economically optimal levels in the
context of a two-community framework. In addition, these emergent flux differences
result in quantitative differences in beach width, such that poorer communities often
realize wider beaches than their wealthier neighbors (Figure 1.9b).

Figure 1.9. (a) Nourishment flux differences and (b) beach width differences for each
two-community pair as a function of their beachfront wealth differences revealing that
poorer communities often nourish more than wealthier communities do and supporting
the model’s result that poorer communities might be over-nourishing compared to their
economically optimal level of effort under coordination. This over-nourishment, in many
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cases, yields wider beaches for poorer communities compared to their wealthier
counterparts.

While it is unclear whether each two-community pair actually coordinated their
nourishment plans or chose their strategies alone in the past, these field observations
compared with our model’s results do suggest that neighboring communities with large
wealth disparities may have foregone benefits by failing to coordinate regional
nourishment strategies. In the face of climate change impacts on coastal New Jersey
communities and worldwide, it will be important to understand how these neighboring
community interactions might change in the future and the potential paths of coupled
coastal behavior based on the different coordination schemes they might undertake.

1.5 Future Conditions: Effect of a Higher Sand Cost and Background Erosion Rate
Subsequent nourishment decisions might rely on a different suite of underlying
physical and economic conditions. A likely future scenario involves higher background
erosion associated with sea-level rise and increases in the cost of sand. The prevalence of
beach nourishment on regional scales increases the demand for sand (Brauchle, 2013).
Additionally, reductions in near-shore-sediment supply shift dredge operations further
offshore, implying that sand is a non-renewable resource (McNamara et al., 2011). Both
expanding demand and diminishing supply drive up the price of sand for beach
nourishment.
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Under the asymmetric wealth scenario represented by the blue star in Figures
(1.5-1.6), behavioral sensitivities to increasing background erosion rate and increasing
sand cost for both coordination levels are depicted in Figure (1.10).

Figure 1.10. Emergent behaviors under (a) coordination and (b) non-coordination based
on the background erosion rate and the sand resource cost, a diagonal transect (A-A’)
through the regime space showing (c) the behavioral transgression from seaward growth
to full retreat, the corresponding nourishment efficiencies for (d) coordinated and (e)
uncoordinated regime spaces, and (f) the decreasing nourishment efficiency along the
diagonal transect (B-B’).

Communities that coordinate will experience a progression from seaward growth
to seaward growth/hold the line to slow retreat to full retreat, highlighting their added
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difficulty in maintaining beaches when faced with more extreme geo-economic forcings
(Figure 1.10a). In contrast, uncoordinated communities will experience this shift from
seaward growth to full retreat much sooner, i.e., for lower sand costs and lower erosion
rates (Figure 1.10b-c). This drives a threshold switch for uncoordinated systems from
over-nourishment in the less wealthy community to under-nourishment system-wide, as
evidenced by the loss of property sooner than had the communities coordinated. The
switch from over-nourishment to under-nourishment occurs because, when choosing a
nourishment strategy alone, the less wealthy community can no longer justify overnourishing, or in other words, the cost of nourishment inefficiency (Figure 1.10e)
outweighs the benefit of protecting beachfront properties. Ultimately, the less wealthy
community acting alone will be unable to nourish at all and will abandon properties
sooner than if it had cooperated with its wealthier neighbor (Figure 1.10a-c). Together,
the uncoordinated communities will reduce their nourishment efforts due to the increased
marginal cost of nourishment inefficiency compared to the benefit provided by frequent
nourishment. These decisions correspond with lower nourishment efficiencies and a more
rapid decline in efficiency than coordinated communities might experience (Figure
1.10d-f).
The vulnerability to property loss for uncoordinated systems in the future mirrors
what is already happening in many communities across the United States, both wealthy
and not, who are struggling to protect their beachfront properties in the face of eroding
beaches and rising seas. Wealthy homeowners in Nantucket, Massachusetts are selffunding their protection efforts (Keneally & Simon, 2020). Likewise, upscale
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neighborhoods in Nags Head, North Carolina, and Malibu, California who both lose
approximately 5-6 feet of beach width per year plan to spend $48 million and $55-60
million respectively to restore their beaches and keep their homes from falling into the
sea (McMullen, 2018). Especially at risk, however, are property owners with fewer
means such as those in Manistee, Michigan whose homes have begun tumbling into Lake
Michigan due to coastal bluff erosion following record-high lake levels in recent years
(Reynolds, 2020). These homeowners often either abandon their properties after their
property values depreciate or sell to developers, which results in bigger homes and thus
more wealth in the most vulnerable locations (Capuzzo, 2017; Lazarus et al., 2018).
These instances and many more around the world will undoubtedly become
commonplace under more extreme conditions in the future. Property-value disparities
might amplify these risks, triggering a sharp transition from seaward growth to property
abandonment for communities that neglect to coordinate their management plans with
their neighbors.

1.6 Discussion and Future Work
A geomorphic-economic model to understand the key drivers influencing a
dynamically coupled-coastal system with two communities was developed. The model
predicted a broad array of emergent-behavioral pathways based on nourishment rotation
length as the control variable. For instance, communities might choose to nourish their
beaches so frequently that their shorelines grow seaward. Conversely, communities might
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choose to nourish their beaches infrequently or not at all, such that they lose nearshore
properties as a result.
Whether this dynamical system can produce the observed coastal anthropic
signatures typically ascribed to uncoordinated management was examined. The model
predicted that communities might accidentally nourish more frequently than is optimal
under a coordinated management program, although this is not a blanket result. Instead,
this behavior persists mainly when neighboring communities have different property
values, and in particular, less wealthy communities in such situations tend to overnourish.
Irrespective of the coordination scheme, neighboring communities with high
baseline property values are predisposed to nourishing frequently, leading ultimately to
seaward growth. These outcomes shed light on how coastal communities might have
behaved in the past; specifically, they might have misallocated nourishment efforts when
the underlying socioeconomic conditions such as alongshore wealth asymmetry between
coastal neighbors was large.
Preliminary evidence of these model trends appears in New Jersey beach
communities. Other local factors that distinguish these systems could affect a
comparison, however. First, groin fields are widespread along the New Jersey coast,
thereby limiting the interconnection between neighboring communities. Second, barrier
islands, comprising most of the southern New Jersey coast, experience washover (i.e., the
transport of sediment from the shoreface to the top or back of the barrier), a process for
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which the model does not account at present. Future work should explore how groin
fields and barrier processes interact with the coupled model by extending it to include
hard structures (Janoff et al., 2019; Kraus & Batten, 2006) and overwash dynamics
(Lorenzo-Trueba & Ashton, 2014).
Third, high recreational values associated with beaches in tourism-centric zones,
where commercial beachfront real estate likely controls nourishment decisions more than
residential properties do, could add complexity to this inter-community relationship. In
particular, potential asymmetries in these beach amenities between neighboring
communities could play a role in determining how they plan their beach nourishments
and whether or not they coordinate such plans. New Jersey is a perfect example of
variability in beach recreational values as evidenced by the wide distribution of beach
badge (use fee) revenues by community, especially from one community to the next
(Hoover, 2017). We plan to explore how these community-scale economic differences
dictate how communities interact with each other when forming their management plans.
Finally, the efficiency of these nourishment projects could differ by community,
namely for those in regions with cross-shore or alongshore sediment deficits. Sand supply
limitations could be due to local effects such as inlets or inlet jetties, which trap sand
updrift, or underlying geologic characteristics on a regional scale. Similarly, communities
that protrude seaward might experience limited alongshore supply. All of these
conditions might decrease the efficiency of nourishment projects for certain communities,
which would force more frequent nourishment than the model predicts. Building off the
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efficiency approximation (Equation 1.10) presented in this paper, future work will
explore how the amount of sand lost from nourishment projects to nearby sediment sinks
over time, and community perceptions about the sustainability of such projects, could
affect community nourishment decisions.
These analyses would help clarify some of the behavioral variability observed in
New Jersey (Figure 1.8). Nonetheless, the comparison between field data and model
results presented in this paper suggests that many neighboring communities in New
Jersey may have adopted an uncoordinated approach, which is also consistent with
anecdotal evidence (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016; Lazarus et al., 2011; Pilkey & Clayton,
1989).
If these communities have benefited economically from their past nourishment
decisions, however, and the consequence of their beachfront property vulnerability (i.e.,
property damage) is largely subsidized by external sources (i.e., federal disaster relief,
federally-/state-funded beach maintenance, flood insurance policy discounts, etc.),
perhaps there is little incentive to overcome potential barriers to coordination and change
behavior in the future. If this is indeed the case, the model suggests that decentralized
communities might experience a rapid switch from over-nourishment to undernourishment in the face of rising sea levels and increasing sand resource costs, and less
wealthy communities are at particularly high risk of losing coastal properties. This
underscores that communities that choose not to coordinate might realize disparities in
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the distribution of wealth along the coast, leading eventually to the persistence only of
wealthier communities there.
As sand resources dwindle and sea levels rise, costs will continue to increase,
beaches will erode more rapidly, and fewer communities will be able to afford beach
nourishment. Using a coordinated scheme, communities could dampen their
vulnerability, but they cannot prevent the eventual loss of properties. Managed retreat is a
topic of growing interest for the scientific community (Rott, 2019), and it has already
become a reality for some homeowners from the heavily developed shores of New York
City (Binder et al., 2015) to the remote coasts of Alaska (Agyeman et al., 2009; Mach et
al., 2019).
While managed retreat approaches focus largely on buyouts as a mechanism for
property removal, the model explored here revealed a different but possibly
complementary strategy of slowing the rate of retreat via infrequent beach nourishment to
incorporate near-term benefits of property preservation in conjunction with relocation.
Interestingly, the model suggests that this behavior of slow retreat is a viable strategy
even without including the incentives comprising buyout programs. If such incentives are
included in our modeling framework, slow retreat could be an even more attractive
solution looking to the future.
It will be difficult to balance the private benefits provided for beachfront
properties, resulting in tax revenues for small coastal municipalities, and the broader
public benefits of beach access for all (Fallon et al., 2017). A framework that accounts for
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all stakeholder components is most likely to succeed, perhaps requiring a mix of
incentives for property owners (buyouts), subsidies for coastal community welfare (beach
nourishment), and reducing coastal development in the most vulnerable areas.
Ultimately, efforts to coordinate climate change adaptation plans such as beach
nourishment might prove to be inadequate against the risks associated with coastal life on
centennial scales. Subsidizing a neighboring community’s beach maintenance might not
avoid the vulnerabilities associated with coastal life, amplified by rapid sea-level rise
rates in the future. Instead, top-down master plans, including planned region-scale
migration from the coast, may be inescapable.
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CHAPTER 2 – DETERMING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
SOCIOECONOMICS, TOURISM, AND GEOMORPHOLOGY IN BEACH
NOURISHMENT DECISIONS
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2.0 Summary
Coastal communities facing erosion maintain their beaches for recreation and
property protection. One form of maintenance is nourishment, the placement of
externally sourced sand to increase cross-shore beach width, forming an ephemeral
seaward protrusion that requires periodic re-nourishment. Nourishment projects add value
to beachfront properties, thus affecting future management choices through feedbacks
between nourishment decisions and the benefits provided to coastal communities.
Previous work explored this socioeconomic control on beach nourishment choice, but
many New Jersey community decisions indicate that other factors may help explain
management patterns. We surmise this is due to the high beach tourism demand
experienced along this heavily developed coast in close proximity to major US cities
(New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington D.C.). To understand how
communities in New Jersey decide their management strategies, we compiled
community-scale data on nourishment projects and estimated their nourishment fluxes,
and combined this information with socioeconomic, tourism, and geomorphologic data.
We run a multiple linear regression under various model specifications and find that both
a community’s beachfront wealth and its proportion of commercial property value (i.e., a
proxy for its level of tourism) help explain its beach nourishment decision. This suggests
that the interplay between socioeconomics and tourism can help us to understand how
communities have managed their beaches, and thus, how coupled natural-human
coastlines have evolved in the past. While most of New Jersey’s coast has been held in
position or even accreted seaward, as sea-level rises and material costs increase, beach
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maintenance may become more difficult over the long-term, requiring expanded
subsidies from federal and state governments. With the viability of increased
expenditures for beach maintenance in question, local governments may experience
difficulty protecting their properties and planned relocation of vulnerable infrastructure
may be required. Tourism-centric communities facing these threats may respond with
different nourishment approaches to meet recreational demand compared to their
residential-dominated counterparts. This paper highlights the added complexity in coastal
policy development within a high tourism, human-modified zone such as New Jersey,
which must be included in deterministic modeling frameworks moving forward.

2.1 Introduction
Coastal communities nourish their beaches for recreational and protective
purposes. Previous literature and empirical evidence from hedonic modeling (i.e.,
quantifying housing, environmental, and neighborhood effects on a property’s value)
found that socioeconomic factors, such as the beachfront property value, likely control
how communities make nourishment decisions (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2011; McNamara
et al., 2015; Smith et al. 2009). In general, the higher a community’s beachfront property
value, the more frequently the community will nourish, or, the shorter the return period
between re-nourishments (i.e. rotation length). However, the frequency is not the only
important metric in distinguishing a community’s nourishment effort; the volume per
nourishment episode is equally as important. A community’s nourishment rate
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(volume/year) therefore captures both of these components, providing information on
how much sand communities are placing on their beaches each year.
Past work found that a community’s nourishment effort depends in part on its
own beachfront property value, but also in part on its neighbor’s property value given
their spatial interconnection (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016; Janoff et al., in review; Jin et
al., 2013; Smith et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2013). The underlying assumption in this
work is that wealthier communities will nourish more while poorer communities will
nourish less. Homing in on New Jersey communities, however, it is not clear that
beachfront wealth is the only determinant of nourishment output and in some cases,
communities with lower wealth might even nourish more than wealthier communities
(Janoff et al., in review).
In fact, Qiu et al. (2020) point out that other factors such as underlying
geophysical conditions could play a role in a community’s nourishment choice as well.
They show that a community’s distance from the nearest tidal inlet, a proxy for its access
to sand resources and thus its realized project cost for beach nourishment, will dictate
how frequently and with how much volume they replenish their beaches.
Other factors in addition to geomorphic site characteristics likely explain this
nourishment variation, however. In coastal regions with an emphasis on seasonal tourism,
such as New Jersey, the value that tourism-dominated communities (i.e., those with a
high proportion of commercial properties) place on their beach is likely different from
residential-dominated communities (i.e., those comprised mostly of residential
properties), which might play a role in how they nourish their beaches.
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Moreover, previous work found that beach amenity values differ by state
(Dundas, 2017; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2011; Parsons et al., 1999; Pompe and Rinehart,
1995), and even by community type, i.e. gated vs. non-gated (Pompe, 2008). There is
also anecdotal evidence of this difference in beach recreational values by municipality in
New Jersey. Deal, NJ, one of the wealthiest coastal communities in the state, opted out of
the countywide nourishment project in 1999, citing concerns over the possible
degradation of fishing/surfing quality at local spots (B. Rosenblatt, personal
communication, January 13, 2017). Furthermore, restrictive parking ordinances and
reductions in public beach access points have led the municipality to multiple court
battles over the past two decades, creating a reputation for attempting to make their
beaches private (Strunsky, 2019). As a result, Deal’s beaches are noticeably narrower
(Figure 2.1a) than neighboring Asbury Park’s beaches, a lower-wealth community with
dense commercial development and a robust tourism-centric economy.

Figure 2.1. Examples of differential hedonic beach values: Asbury Park/Deal (a), and
Seaside Heights/Lavallette (b).

59

While intuition suggests that beaches provide more value to wealthier
homeowners in the form of protection, the intentional reduction in recreational benefits
by wealthy homeowners could mean that their beach’s amenity value is lower than
expected. Only recently, in 2016, did the community of Deal begin participating in
nourishment projects, largely due to the flood damages associated with Super Storm
Sandy and the expanded funding availability as a result of the consequent federal disaster
relief package (Gladden, 2015).
Similarly, in Lavallette/Seaside Heights (Figure 2.1b), wealthier Lavallette is a
residential beach community whereas the lower-wealth community, Seaside Heights is a
boardwalk hub replete with rides, Ferris Wheels, concessions, and games on their pier
and beachfront facilities. Seaside Heights nourishes more frequently and with larger
volumes of sand, resulting in wider beaches than Lavallette and higher recreational
revenues.
Beach revenues and the tourism industry linked to these physical beach
characteristics (i.e. beach widths) are directly affected by preceding nourishment
decisions, which depend on past tourism-related revenues, thus describing a recreationdriven feedback. This could translate into a difference in nourishment policies for highwealth and low-wealth communities based on their respective levels of tourism.
While previous work has explored the relationship between wealth and beach
nourishment frequency (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2011; McNamara et al., 2015; Smith et al.,
2009), few to no studies have explored a complete portfolio of other possible drivers of
these management decisions, which could include both economic and geophysical
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factors. We seek to test the interactions among socioeconomics, tourism, and
geomorphology in controlling community-scale beach nourishment decisions. Our main
socioeconomic variable of interest is the value of beachfront properties in a community,
which is the primary determinant tested in other coupled geo-economic studies on beach
nourishment (McNamara et al., 2011; Murray et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2009). We expand
on this analysis to include other components that might help explain why communities
nourish as they do, particularly in the tourism-dominated region of the New Jersey coast.
Tourism variables of interest include the revenue generated by beach recreation,
the ratio between the aggregate assessed values of commercial and residential properties,
and the community’s distance from the nearest tourism-concentrated zone. These
variables could help explain why communities with lower property values might choose
nourishment policies different from expected if oceanfront wealth is the only predictor of
beach nourishment considered.
Underlying site geomorphology might also help explain these nourishment
decisions, due either to differences in local sediment supply or to coastline orientation
effects such as alongshore or cross-shore gradients in sediment fluxes. One geomorphic
variable of interest is a community’s distance downdrift of the nearest tidal inlet, which
could serve as a sediment sink that limits downdrift availability or as a sediment source
that supplies immediately adjacent beaches with sand via ebb-tidal delta attachment bars
(Kraus, 2000; Kraus, 2002; Nienhuis and Ashton, 2016; Nienhuis and Lorenzo-Trueba,
2019a; Nienhuis and Lorenzo-Trueba, 2019b).
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A second geomorphic variable we would like to test as a potential nourishment
predictor is the underlying efficiency of nourishment projects, or, the rate at which the
nourishment sand erodes from its placement location. This efficiency is a common
research topic for coastal engineers (Benedet and Dobrochinski, 2017; Kuang et al.,
2011; Roberts and Wang, 2012; Tonnon et al., 2018), though its connection as a control
on nourishment policy has not been explored, to our knowledge. We estimate
nourishment efficiency via the half-life of a nourishment project.
In this chapter, we broaden the understanding of what drives community-scale
nourishment decisions. We test an array of predictors including socioeconomic factors
such as a community’s level of wealth; its level of local tourism/recreation; its regional
proximity to beach tourism economies; and its geophysical site characteristics such as its
supply or deficit of natural sand resources. From our analysis, we implement the key
drivers of nourishment policy into the geo-economic modeling framework described by
Janoff et al. (in review) that accounts both for the natural and for the economic evolution
of a heavily developed coastal system. This analysis provides information on how the key
predictors of community-scale nourishment policies manifest in the morphodynamics of a
community’s beach to help describe the past geomorphic outcomes observed at New
Jersey field sites, and how these drivers will interact with future climate change effects
such as heightened erosion rates due to sea-level rise.
Insights from this work and other literature expanding the envelope of
explanatory predictors of coastal management decisions must be taken into account in
deterministic modeling frameworks in the future, not only to understand how these
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systems might change, but also to supply regional and local managers with the tools
necessary to make hyperopic and sustainable decisions moving forward.

2.2 Methods
In order to test the relationship between socioeconomics/tourism/geomorphology
and community-scale nourishment choices, we run a multiple linear regression using
Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software with the set of variables outlined above that
we predict will help explain community-scale management decisions. We build a
statewide dataset for all New Jersey communities with a history of beach nourishment
practices (Figure 2.2).

Figure 2.2. Regional locations of New Jersey communities for the northern (a) and
southern coasts (b).

63

Below, we present each variable that is used in our analysis, split by category: 1)
socioeconomics (i.e., beachfront wealth); 2) tourism (i.e., beach recreational revenues,
local proportion of tourism, and proximity to tourism centers); and 3) geomorphology
(i.e., site and regional characteristics affecting sediment availability and beach erosion).
The general form of the nourishment regression is thus: Nourishment =
f(socioeconomics, tourism, geomorphology). Methods of data collection/processing are
listed in the appendix (Table A2.1).
We hypothesize that these three broader categories and the corresponding
explanatory variables within these categories determine a community’s nourishment
choice as follows:
•

Increasing a community’s beachfront property value/wealth will increase the rate
at which the community nourishes its beach (i.e., nourishment rate) because the
community will have higher tax revenues from which they can fund nourishment
projects and larger demand for private property protection from damaging storm
surges.

•

Increasing a community’s beach recreational revenues will increase its
nourishment rate because the community will not only have a larger operational
balance for appropriating funds to management projects but they also have a
higher recreational demand for which they must supply a sufficiently wide beach.

•

Increasing a community’s proportion of aggregate commercial value will increase
its nourishment rate because communities must not only protect private residential
properties from storm surge, but also cater to the influx of non-local beach users
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who are recreating on their municipal beaches and patronizing their local
businesses.
•

Increasing a community’s distance from the nearest tourism center (i.e.,
community with a high proportion of commercial real estate) will decrease its
nourishment rate because it places less importance on maintaining a wide beach
for the potential spatial recreational spillover from the tourism center should its
beach reach capacity. Conversely, we could also expect that communities
immediately adjacent to tourism centers might nourish less than communities
further from tourism centers in the hopes of free riding off the tourism center’s
nourishment efforts.

•

Increasing a community’s distance downdrift of the nearest tidal inlet updrift will
decrease its nourishment rate because it will not be starved of sand by the ebbtidal delta that might serve as a sediment sink which thus would limit sand
availability to downdrift beaches. Increased distance downdrift likely dampens
this effect.

•

Increasing the nourishment efficiency (i.e., increasing the nourishment project’s
half-life) in a community will decrease its nourishment rate because the longer
that artificially-added beach sand remains on a community’s beach, the less
frequently and with smaller magnitude they must re-nourish in the future.

We test the effect of these independent variables listed above on the dependent
variable, nourishment rate, using a multiple linear regression analysis for an array of
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model specifications and combinations of independent variables. We also test how the
interaction between the geomorphic variables and the socioeconomic variables listed
above, and discuss in more detail in subsequent sections. We present the normal
regression as the base model in this paper because it corresponds with the highest
adjusted R-square value of our initial regression analyses, and provides direct insight into
the key drivers of nourishment policy without possible endogeneity associated with any
of our independent variables listed above. To elaborate, while we predict that
nourishment efficiency will help to determine a community’s nourishment rate, the
amount of sand communities add to their beaches could re-orient alongshore gradients or
re-position the shoreline in deeper water, such that more sand could be lost via
alongshore or cross-shore transport. The nourishment efficiency, therefore, could actually
depend on the nourishment rate as well. This endogeneity could introduce bias, and so we
avoid any model that includes nourishment efficiency as a significant independent
variable.
The other two specifications we test are the lognormal and log-log regression
models, which are listed in appendix A2.2. In addition, we provide a more detailed
justification for why we use the normal regression as the representative empirical
relationship in appendix A2.3. To determine the relative importance of each variable x in
predicting the nourishment rate, we calculate the standardized value Xst of the vector of
independent variables using its mean value μx and its standard deviation σx:
𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =

𝑥𝑥−𝜇𝜇𝑥𝑥
𝜎𝜎𝑥𝑥

.

(2.1)
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The dependent variable, nourishment rate, is standardized in the same fashion. In this
way, the estimated parameters for the independent variables have equal ranges between
zero and one, and thus, their orders of magnitude are comparable. We run this
standardized normal model with the forward, backward, and stepwise processes to
determine the set of significant parameters that best explains the nourishment rate. We
also test all model combinations and isolate the model with the lowest root mean square
error (RMSE), which represents the most accurate model fit of all possible models with
the vector of independent variables X.
While this regression model provides information on the main factors controlling
community-scale beach nourishment decisions, however, these empirical relationships do
not provide explicit information on the physical morphology of the coast. We implement
these empirical relationships found in our regression analysis that govern the rate at
which communities nourish their beaches into the coupled geomorphic-economic
modeling framework described in Janoff et al. (2019) and Janoff et al. (in review).
This model accounts for alongshore and cross-shore dynamics of shoreline
change, assuming that seaward protrusions are diffusive and that beach nourishment sand
is redistributed to adjacent shorelines and offshore to the shoreface toe when the
shoreface is steepened beyond its equilibrium slope (Figure 2.3). Resultant changes in
beach width are then capitalized into beachfront property values, and when combined
with the costs of these nourishment projects, provide information on the net benefit of
these management policies.
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Figure 2.3. Idealized deterministic modeling framework described in Janoff et al. (in
review) that accounts for both alongshore/cross-shore dynamics and socioeconomic
effects on beachfront properties due to this physical morphology.
We modify this coupled geo-economic model (Janoff et al., 2019; Janoff et al., in
review) that accounts for nourishment as periodic events and implement a continuous
nourishment rate, which is consistent with our field data and the regression model’s
output. Changes in shoreline position xS,i are computed using the discretized ordinary
differential equation Δxs,i/Δt for each cell:
∆𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
∆𝑡𝑡

=

2 ∙ �𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖−1 (𝑡𝑡)−𝑞𝑞𝐿𝐿,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)�
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖

−

4∙𝑞𝑞𝐶𝐶,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝐷𝐷

− 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,

(2.2)

where qL,i and qC,i are given by the slopes of the alongshore gradient and the shoreface
respectively. Here, the nourishment term Ni is the nourishment rate as determined by the
regression model and implemented as the volume of external sand added to the subaerial
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beach per year. This nourishment rate is based on the empirical relationship with the
significant independent variables from the normal regression model, i.e., the beachfront
wealth and the commercial-residential value ratio, which will be discussed in section
2.3.1. Using this model as a baseline, we test geomorphic variable (i.e., the nourishment
half-life and the inlet distance) interactions with these two socioeconomic variables for
the following specifications: the economic variables multiplied/divided by the
geomorphic variables; the economic variables multiplied/divided by the natural log of the
geomorphic variables; and the economic variables multiplied/divided by the geomorphic
variables squared. All input parameters used in this geo-economic modeling framework
are listed in appendix A2.4 (Table A2.8).

2.3 Results
2.3.1 Empirical Regression Model
All regression selection processes for the normal model suggest the same set of
independent variables best predicts the nourishment rate: 1) the total beachfront wealth,
and 2) the commercial-residential assessment value ratio. We find that each parameter
estimate is significant at the 95% confidence level (Table 2.1).
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Table 2.1. Parameter estimates for the normal model (total beachfront wealth and
commercial-residential ratio) showing the effect of each independent variable on the
nourishment rate.
Parameter Estimates
Variable

df

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

t Value

Pr > |t|

Intercept
Total
Beachfront
Wealth
CommercialResidential
Ratio

1
1

-7800.23
1.51·10-4

17556.00
4.03·10-5

-0.44
3.74

0.66
< 0.01

1

223965.00

85407.00

2.62

0.01

In general, as a community’s total beachfront wealth increases or as its share of
commercial real estate value increases, the community will nourish more per year. This
suggests that both socioeconomics and tourism have a positive linear impact on
nourishment policy decisions, and that residential property values are not the only
determinant of how a community will manage its beach. The standardized version of this
model also indicates that a community’s total beachfront wealth has a larger effect on its
nourishment rate than the commercial-residential assessment value ratio (Table 2.2). This
supports previous literature’s assumption that property value is the primary driver of a
community’s nourishment decision (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2011; McNamara et al., 2015;
Smith et al., 2009), but highlights that a community’s proportion of commercial
development, a proxy for its level of tourism, is also an important control on beach
management.
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Table 2.2. Parameter estimates for the standardized normal model (total beachfront
wealth and commercial-residential ratio) showing the relative importance (i.e., magnitude
of parameter estimate) of each independent variable on the nourishment rate.
Parameter Estimates
Variable

df

Parameter
Estimate

Standard Error

t Value

Pr > |t|

Intercept
Total
Beachfront
Wealth
CommercialResidential
Ratio

1
1

-1.70·10-16
0.54

0.14
0.14

0
3.74

1.00
< 0.01

1

0.38

0.14

2.62

0.01

Nourishment rates observed in the field align moderately with predicted
nourishment rates, although much of the variability cannot be explained by the model and
is thus assigned to regression error in the absence of other explanatory variables (adjusted
R-square = 0.32, Figure 2.4). This model that includes the commercial-residential ratio,
however, explains approximately 13% of the remaining variability that cannot be
explained by a linear regression for beachfront wealth alone (adjusted R-square = 0.19).
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the level of commercial development is an
important characteristic of a community in determining its beach management strategy as
well. We integrate both the significant predictors and the corresponding nourishment rate
into the geo-economic modeling framework constructed in Janoff et al. (in review).
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Figure 2.4. Observed vs. predicted nourishment rates for the normal regression model
that includes a community’s beachfront wealth and its proportion of commercial real
estate as predictors.
2.3.2 Geomorphic-economic Interaction Regressions
The normal regression model presented in the previous section highlights the
importance of including other socioeconomic variables as predictors of nourishment
decisions, such as the extent of commercial real estate development within a community.
While these variables help explain approximately 1/3rd of the variation in nourishment
rates (adjusted R-square = 0.32; Figure 2.4), it should be noted that the importance of
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socioeconomic conditions relative to the coast’s physical conditions might be specific to
New Jersey (Silberman and Klock, 1988). The high tourism and property values along
this stretch coast, which is in close proximity to major urban centers such as New York
City and Philadelphia, could be out-competing the underlying geomorphic conditions of
the region.
Building off of the main components in the base model, we explore how the
model’s two socioeconomic variables (i.e., wealth and tourism) interact with the
geomorphic variables (i.e., the nourishment half-life and the distance downdrift of a tidal
inlet). We run various interaction scenarios: economic variable multiplication/division by
geomorphic variable, economic variable multiplication/division by natural log of
geomorphic variable; and economic variable multiplication/division by the square of the
geomorphic variable. Similar to the model selection process outlined in previous sections
(2.2-2.3.1), we present the geo-interaction models for half-life and inlet distance that
result in the lowest RMSE and the highest adjusted R-square value.
The geo-interaction model that includes a community’s nourishment half-life, i.e.,
a metric of its physical efficiency, is comprised of the total beachfront wealth and the
commercial-residential ratio divided by the half-life (i.e., the geo-interaction variable).
Both the wealth and the geo-interaction variable have positive parameter estimates, such
that increasing the wealth or the commercial-residential ratio results in higher
nourishment rates, and increasing the half-life results in lower nourishment rates (Table
2.3). This relationship aligns with the base model presented in section 3.1 and our subhypothesis for half-life, in which we expected that higher efficiency nourishments (i.e.,
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longer half-lives) allow communities to nourish less frequently, or with less volume, both
of which correspond with a lower nourishment rate.

Table 2.3. Parameter estimates for the geomorphic-economic interaction regression
models that includes (1) a community’s beachfront wealth and the commercial-residential
ratio divided by the nourishment half-life, and (2) the commercial-residential ratio and
the product of the beachfront wealth the natural log of the inlet distance.
Parameter Estimates: Geo-interaction Model 1 (Half-life)
Variable

df

Parameter
Estimate

Standard
Error

t Value

Intercept 1
3637.95
15265
0.24
-4
-5
Total Beachfront 1
1.38·10
3.88·10
3.55
Wealth
Commercial- 1
89970
30513
2.95
Residential Ratio
/ Half-life
Parameter Estimates: Geo-interaction Model 2 (Inlet Distance)
Variable

df

Intercept
CommercialResidential Ratio
Total Beachfront
Wealth · ln(Inlet
Distance)

Pr > |t|

0.81
< 0.01
< 0.01

Standard
Error
18185
85224

t Value

Pr > |t|

1
1

Parameter
Estimate
-12648
235722

-0.70
2.77

0.49
< 0.01

1

1.88·10-5

4.90·10-6

3.85

< 0.01

The geo-interaction model that includes the community’s distance downdrift of a
tidal inlet, i.e., a proxy for its natural sediment availability, is comprised of the
commercial-residential ratio and the product of the total beachfront wealth and the natural
log of the inlet distance (Table 2.3). Both parameters have a positive estimate, such that
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increasing the extent of commercial development, increasing the beachfront wealth, and
increasing the distance downdrift of an inlet results in a higher nourishment rate. This is
consistent with the base model and one of our sub-hypotheses for inlet distance, in which
inlets serve as a sediment source for downdrift communities, supplying immediately
adjacent beaches with sand and thus resulting in lower nourishment rates closer to inlets.
Communities further downdrift do not benefit as much from this natural sediment supply
and respond with higher nourishment rates, though the relationship between increasing
distance downdrift and increasing nourishment rate is nonlinear. It is important to note,
however, that this result could differ by region due to differences in net vs. gross
alongshore sediment transport, the influence of partially/fully-jettied inlets vs. natural
inlets, and differences in ebb-shoal delta dynamics between the central New Jersey coast
(Monmouth/Ocean Counties) and the southern New Jersey coast (Atlantic/Cape May
Counties).
Both of these geo-interaction models help explain more of the variation in
observed nourishment rates, with adjusted R-square values of 0.35 and 0.33 for the halflife and inlet distance models respectively (Figure 2.5). This result highlights that while
socioeconomics plays a primary role in determining how New Jersey communities
choose their beach management strategies, natural characteristics of a site such as its
sediment availability or deficit are also important components. These models add
information on community-scale nourishment and highlight that the interplay between
socioeconomics and geomorphology is key to understanding how communities choose to
intervene in the coastal environment.
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Figure 2.5. Observed vs. predicted nourishment rates for the geomorphic-economic
interaction regression models that includes (a) a community’s beachfront wealth and the
commercial-residential ratio divided by the nourishment half-life and (b) the commercialresidential ratio and the product of the beachfront wealth the natural log of the inlet
distance.
2.3.3 Geo-economic Model Behaviors and Future Vulnerability
We implement the base regression model (Section 2.3.1) into the numerical geoeconomic model framework (Janoff et al. in review), and test the model’s sensitivity to
the beachfront wealth and the commercial-residential ratio, specifically focusing on the
emergent mode behaviors. Communities can experience seaward growth, in which their
beach widens over time (Figure 2.6a); hold the line, in which their beach does not widen
but beachfront properties are maintained (Figure 2.6b); slow retreat, in which
nourishment projects delay but ultimately accept beachfront property loss (Figure 2.6c);
and full retreat, in which the community does not nourish and their beachfront properties
are lost at the rate of background erosion (Figure 2.6d).
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Figure 2.6. Example mode behaviors produced by the modified geo-economic model:
seaward growth (a); hold the line (b); slow retreat with nourishment (c); and full retreat
without nourishment (d).
Low-wealth communities with mostly residential properties will nourish enough
to maintain their beach width, while wealthier communities or those with a larger
proportion of commercial real estate will widen their beaches (Figure 2.7a).
Superimposed on this regime space is each New Jersey community color-coded by its
categorical mode behavior. This behavior is determined by the difference in shoreline
locations between 1899 and 2012 for each community, where >50% seaward shoreline
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change corresponds to seaward growth, <50% shoreline change maintenance is classified
as hold the line, and >50% landward shoreline change corresponds to retreat (slow retreat
in nourishing communities; full retreat in non-nourishing communities). Red circles
indicate communities that have prograded their shorelines seaward, while blue circles
indicate communities that have held their shorelines in place (Figure 2.7a).
Approximately 65% of the model’s behavioral predictions match the categorical
field behaviors, and more importantly, both the model and field support our hypothesis
that low wealth communities with a high proportion of commercial real estate can
nourish with large rates, and thus, result in seaward growing shorelines. In addition,
nearly all of the field observations that comprise hold the line behavior are residentialdominated communities. This indicates that the distinction between tourism-dominated
and residential-dominated communities can help explain some of the counterintuitive
geomorphic-economic trends we have observed along the U.S. east coast (i.e., less
wealthy communities nourishing more and resulting in wider beaches than wealthier
communities) and should be included when determining the future of developed
coastlines more broadly.
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Figure 2.7. Emergent mode behaviors (a) based on the nourishment rates determined by
its relationship with total beachfront wealth and the commercial-residential assessment
value ratio from the normal regression model. New Jersey field observations are included
in the regime space and color-coded by their field behaviors (red: seaward growth; blue:
hold the line) to show how many communities experience each mode behavior and
whether the nourishment projects result in a positive or negative net benefit for the local
residential community. Also included are shoreline evolution subplots for each behavior
(b-c) through time for both residential-dominant and commercial-dominant communities
experiencing seaward growth and hold the line behaviors respectively.
In the future, expected increases in erosion rates associated with sea-level-rise
rates will make it more difficult for communities to maintain their beachfront properties.
Should communities continue nourishing at the same rate in the future, compared to the
baseline behaviors under current conditions (Figure 2.7a), fewer communities will
experience seaward growth, and more communities will experience hold the line or slow
retreat (Figure 2.8a). Eventually, more extreme erosion rates will force most (Figure
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2.8b) or all communities to abandon beachfront properties (Figure 2.8c-d) even with
nourishment action in place. In addition to enhanced erosion rates, nearshore sand supply
will decrease due to continued, expansive nourishment programs, forcing dredging
operations further offshore, thus driving the price of sand up. Should communities
experience increases in sand cost, erosion rate , or likely both , it may become more
difficult for communities to maintain their nourishment policies in the future,
highlighting the added economic difficulty for coastal communities facing the effects of
climate change as well.
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Figure 2.8. Emergent mode behaviors based on the nourishment rates determined by its
relationship with total beachfront wealth and the commercial-residential assessment value
ratio from the normal regression model for an increasing background erosion rate: γ = 1
m/yr (a); γ = 2 m/yr (b); γ = 3 m/yr (c); γ = 4 m/yr (d). Field observations color-coded by
current behavior (red: seaward growth; blue: hold the line) are included to show their
behavioral transition in the future if they maintain their status quo nourishment policy.
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2.4 Discussion
While under current climate and economic conditions, most all coastal
communities have been able to maintain or even widen their beaches over the last half
century due to extensive artificial beach nourishment policies (Armstrong and Lazarus,
2019; Janoff et al., in review), the future sustainability of these communities is less clear.
It is even more uncertain how communities comprised primarily of residential properties
might choose management strategies differently from communities focused on beach
recreation and a commercial tourism industry. In addition, the extent of rental properties,
full-time homes, and secondary homes within a residential-dominant community could
affect the community’s nourishment choices. These differences in socioeconomic
structure by community type and even a community’s proximity to nearby tourismdominated communities will likely leave a categorically distinct signature on the
evolution of developed coasts. In addition, local geomorphological impacts will also
interact with and feedback on these human-scale components in unknown ways under
future conditions associated with climate change such as sea-level rise and diminished
resource availability.
The level of intervention required of these communities will not remain static;
instead, a regional re-analysis of our management approach is likely required. This
impending choice centers on whether to increase beach nourishment efforts to keep pace
with increasing rates of erosion, thus further fueling the positive feedback that has
increased both wealth and the magnitude of beach nourishment interventions on decadal
timescales (Armstrong et al., 2016); or, disband current management frameworks with
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state and local governments, remove vulnerable infrastructure, and accept property
relocation in high risk zones toward developing a more hyperopic management view.
This paper adds to the growing body of developed coast literature in highlighting
that a community’s beachfront property value is not the sole predictor on its current or
future beach management decisions. Instead, the economic extent of the local tourism
industry and the interplay between socioeconomics and geomorphology are important,
and must be considered when analyzing how communities will respond to increased
erosion.
The New Jersey coast’s proximity to New York City and Philadelphia promotes
steady demand for beach recreation and beachfront property ownership (Silberman and
Klock, 1988), which will likely serve to entrench our current management mentality
toward holding the line and protecting our vulnerable infrastructure. This may be
especially true for communities whose economies rely heavily on hospitality and
recreational services. It is unlikely that communities will consent to moving away from
the coast voluntarily, thereby giving up their prime real estate, reducing their municipal
property tax revenues, and losing their local businesses that anchor their seasonal tourism
economies. It is possible that tourism-dominant communities will demand even more
protection than residential-dominant communities in the future, possibly serving to focus
state and federal subsidy programs on such areas with high recreational values.
The complex sociopolitical dynamics between neighboring communities fighting
for limited and likely more expensive sand resources coupled with a potentially
apprehensive federal government will only exacerbate these existing challenges to coastal
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management, whose weight is often felt most by environmental justice and low-income
communities.
Furthermore, while our analysis supports the theory that the proportion of
commercial real estate in a community might make up for its lower property values in
explaining its high rates of nourishment and thus its wide beaches, we find evidence from
the field that suggest some lower-wealth communities may be nourishing with large
magnitudes even in the absence of an extensive local tourism economy. This harkens
back to findings from Janoff et al. (in review) who suggest that low-wealth communities
may be over-nourishing, or nourishing more than they otherwise would have had they
coordinated their nourishment plans on regional scales with neighboring communities.
This highlighting not only the interconnectivity of these coastal systems but also the
socioeconomic and geomorphic consequences that might result from community-scale
differences in wealth or tourism-related benefits.
In order to understand how heavily developed coastlines, such as New Jersey, and
how communities in particular might adapt in economically/environmentally sustainable
ways, deterministic models must be developed that account for shifts in the decisionmaking process and for the various changes to both natural and human components
within this coupled system. These will not only include changes to coastal real estate
markets but also disruptions to local tourism economies and to the value of beaches as
recreational amenities.
Previous work highlighted property value as a primary determinant of how
communities have interacted with shoreline dynamics in the past and how these
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interactions might change in the future (Armstrong et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2009;
Lazarus et al., 2011). Recent work has built on these findings, considering the
interconnected dynamics of neighboring communities making different nourishment
decisions based on their level of coordination (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016; Janoff et al.,
in review; Jin et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2015). Further, Qiu et al. (2020) suggested that
underlying geophysical conditions in the coastal environment can also help explain why
communities have managed their beaches in specific ways depending on their spatial
proximity to sand resources.
Our empirical analysis here adds to this growing list of nourishment predictors,
highlighting the importance of tourism within a community. Additionally, our initial
attempt at incorporating these relationships into a semi-empirical, geo-economic
modeling framework features the importance of including tourism as a control on the
regional geomorphic trends we observe in the field, such as seaward prograding
shorelines (Armstrong and Lazarus, 2019; Hapke et al., 2013). Further, natural
geomorphologic conditions, such as sediment delivery and sand retention at nourishment
sites are important components of nourishment choices, though further work is needed to
understand the effect of tidal inlets based on regionally distinct characteristics between
central (Monmouth/Ocean Counties) and southern (Atlantic/Cape May Counties) New
Jersey.
We use the geo-economic framework based on the normal regression model’s
parameter estimates to predict how community-scale decisions will interact with higher
erosion rates associated with sea-level rise in the future, and show that communities
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might not only have a harder time maintaining wide beaches, but they will also be
susceptible to property loss.
It will be important within future deterministic modeling frameworks and/or the
continued development of these existing frameworks, however, to account for a wider
suite of community-scale differences, including the interactions between socioeconomics,
tourism, and geomorphology, and to find ways in which we can analyze the
socioeconomic evolution of communities dominated by commercial real estate. This
paper provides a potential avenue toward addressing this goal, but more work is required
to fully understand how beach morphodynamic changes are capitalized into a tourism
economy. This information will not only further our intrinsic understanding of the
evolution of coupled natural-human systems such as urbanized coasts with variable
community types, but also will be critical for local governments faced with the expanding
challenges associated with climate change and the federal and state governments helping
to facilitate these difficult management decisions in order to maximize social welfare.
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CHAPTER 3 – A GEO-ECONOMIC MODEL TO EXPLORE COMMUNITY
RESPONSES TO DOWNDRIFT GROIN-INDUCED EROSION

The contents of this chapter partially appear in:
Janoff, A., Lorenzo-Trueba, J., Hoagland, P., Jin, D., & Ashton, A. (2019). Coupling
Geomorphology and Socioeconomics to Account for Groin Downdrift Erosion. In P.
Wang, J. D. Rosati, M. Vallee (Eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Conference,
(pp. 1826–1839). Tampa/St. Petersburg, FL: International Conference on Coastal
Sediments 2019. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789811204487_0158
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3.0 Summary
Coastal communities use hard and soft engineering to sustain beach
recreation and to protect physical properties and infrastructure. Soft engineering
involves external sand placement to widen beaches artificially; this placement is
typically termed ‘nourishment’. Hard engineering involves the construction of
immovable objects, such as shore-perpendicular groins, which slow alongshore
currents and deposit sediments locally at and updrift of the objects. While groins
accrete sediment updrift, they also limit downdrift sediment supply, exacerbating
erosion and often forcing downdrift communities to respond with new
engineering measures. We have developed a coupled geo-economic model to
explore how communities make relevant management decisions. The model
identifies a set of factors that could help explain the geo-economic condition and
timing of a community’s responses to groin-induced erosion as observed in New
Jersey. These include the community’s beachfront property value and its size (a
proxy for its tax base), both of which determine its ability to finance groin
construction or beach nourishment projects. Results of model simulations for
future conditions, such as higher background erosion rates and higher rock
material costs, suggest that management interventions will likely be economically
infeasible, resulting in beachfront property loss and retreat from the coast.
Depending on the balance between erosion rates and economic conditions, the
model also highlights the possibility that the historical transition away from
groins to beach nourishment as the main management response could be reversed
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in the future, and groins could again become the more commonplace intervention
as communities adapt to sea-level rise.

3.1 Introduction
More than two-thirds of the world’s largest cities are located on
coastlines (Uzun and Celik, 2014). As of 2003, coastal counties in the United
States comprised 53% of the national population but only 17% of the coterminous
land area (Crossett et al., 2004). Dense coastal development led to engineering
activities to protect assets and maintain beaches. Living close to the ocean serves
as an amenity, creating the base for local and tourist economies, and there is an
inherent desire to protect private and public infrastructure associated with them,
including residential/commercial properties, roads, boardwalks, water and gas
lines, sewers, stormwater infrastructure, communications systems, etc. (Johnston
et al., 2014). Beaches and oceans have high recreational values as well, providing
public goods and services for surfers, anglers, swimmers, scuba-divers, birders,
sunbathers, and other beach/ocean users (Ariza et al., 2014; Sano et al., 2011). In
addition, many coastal homeowners conserve their properties for future
generations, implying high bequest values (Silberman et al., 1992). Taken
altogether, the coastal zone encompasses a variety of amenities that humans seek
to preserve.
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Property owners and coastal managers have utilized soft and hard
engineering to protect properties and to sustain beach recreation (Douglass and
Krolak, 2008; van Rijn, 2011). Soft engineering involves external sand placement,
known as replenishment, nourishment, or beach fill, to widen beaches artificially
(Hoagland et al., 2012). This ‘soft’ approach may require regular maintenance as
sand spreads alongshore, however, resulting in the need for periodic renourishment (Landry, 2004; Smith et al., 2009). Hard engineering involves the
construction of immovable objects, such as shore-perpendicular groins, which
slow alongshore currents to deposit sediments locally at and updrift of the object
(Kraus and Batten, 2007; Mestanza et al., 2018; Valsamidis and Reeve, 2017).
A small but growing literature on hedonic pricing has shown that
properties benefit economically from local beach widening caused by both beach
nourishment and the emplacement of groins (Gopalakrishnan et al., 2011; Landry
and Hindsley, 2011; Pompe and Rinehart, 1995). Rational communities will
choose their most efficient protective option, providing the most benefit for the
least cost. Beach maintenance in updrift communities may encourage “freeriding” behavior in downdrift communities, where the downdrift communities
benefit without being required to contribute to the cost of protection (Williams et
al., 2013). Depending upon local coastal dynamics, the alongshore extent of
groin-stabilized updrift shorelines can even lead to free-riding by communities in
the updrift direction.
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While groins stabilize updrift beaches, they also limit downdrift sediment
supply, exacerbating erosion and often forcing vulnerable communities to respond
with new engineering measures (Brown et al., 2016; Bruun, 1995; Ells and
Murray, 2012). If these communities have the necessary resources, they will be
able to stabilize their shorelines, an example of which can be seen in southern
Long Beach Island, NJ, where Holgate built groins and nourished their beaches
after a certain amount of time, resulting in a downdrift-hardened coast with a
significant shoreline offset relative to the updrift community, Beach Haven
(Figure 3.1a).
Where groins or beach nourishment are economically difficult to justify,
downdrift communities might abandon properties altogether (Tischler, 2006). An
example of a multi-property abandonment occurred in coastal New Jersey during
the early 20th century when the town of South Cape May experienced accelerated
rates of beach erosion as a consequence of updrift development and the
construction of groins in Cape May City (Tischler, 2006; Figure 3.1b). Cape May
City properties were more highly valued than those in South Cape May, and the
community chose to invest in the emplacement of coastal protections, thereby
accelerating beach erosion in the downdrift community. Along with storm surge
damages, the loss of South Cape May properties to accelerated beach erosion
forced the town into bankruptcy (Tischler, 2006).
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Figure 3.1. 1870s map of southern Long Beach Island, NJ (a) and 1931 map of
South Cape May, NJ (b) superimposed on current aerial imagery showing the
shoreline offsets that result from updrfit groin constructions. In one case, the
downdrift community responded with subsequent groin constructions and beach
nourishment (Holgate), while in another, the downdrift community filed for
bankruptcy and abandoned their properties/community altogether.
Here, our objective is to present a simple model coupling geomorphology
and socioeconomics along developed coasts to help understand strategy selection
behavior for a community downdrift of a neighbor that built a groin updrift. Our
research differs from the earlier literature exploring developed coast behavior in
that we model the interaction between hard structures (groins) and soft structures
(nourishment) to examine the role of groin-induced downdrift abandonment vs.
management intervention while also analyzing the benefits and costs of these
decisions. The model compares different protective strategies (i.e., soft
engineering, hard engineering, a combination of the two, time-delayed
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intervention, and ‘do nothing’ resulting in property abandonment) to maximize
economic efficiency, encompassing the feedback between natural coastal
morphodynamics and human-scale modifications to the system. We will explore
how different system characteristics (i.e., parameter values) might affect
management choices in sediment-starved communities downdrift of a groin.

3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Beach Morphodynamics
We use an idealized geometry modified from previous work (Janoff et al., in
review 2021; Janoff et al., 2019) to predict shoreline change averaged across a
community (Figure 3.2). We assume an average number of cross-shore property
rows n. Alongshore input sediment transport QL,1 is calculated using the CERC
formula, and is a function of the wave climate (i.e., fixed wave angle χ and the
wave height H) and the alongshore flux coefficient K1:
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿,1 (t) = K1 ∙ 𝐻𝐻 5/2 ∙ cos(𝜒𝜒 − 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡)) ∙ sin(𝜒𝜒 − 𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡))

(3.1)

QL,2 represents the bypass sediment flux around the groin with length L

placed between communities i=1 and i=2 (Figure 3.2, Kraus and Batten, 1994).
Bypass is governed by the input sediment flux into the updrift cell QL,1 and the
ratio between the beach width wi and the groin length L:
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿,2 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿,1 (𝑡𝑡) ∙

𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)
𝐿𝐿

.

For the case in which the system’s shorelines are beyond the groin’s seaward
limit, the beach morphodynamics are governed by the alongshore transport

(3.2)
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equation (3.1) where the shoreline gradient μ is determined by their shoreline
positions xS,1 and xS,2 as:
𝜇𝜇(𝑡𝑡) =

�xS,i (t)−xS,i+1 (t)�
(si +si+1 )/2

(3.3)

We assume a flat updrift shoreline (i.e., μ=0) such that input sediment flux to the
model domain is a function of the system’s wave climate only, rather than any
localized shoreline perturbations.
Using the cross-shore and alongshore dynamics presented in Janoff et al.
(in review 2021), we can describe the system at any point in time with two
variables, the shoreline location xs,i and the shoreface toe xT,i (Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2. Model setup planview (a) with modified sediment flux between
communities using the bypass equation (2). Cross-section (b) illustrates the depth
of closure and equilibrium condition governing shoreface dynamics in the vicinity
of a groin.
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In contrast with the model framework originally presented by Janoff et al.
(in review), which implements nourishment as discrete and periodic events, we
implement nourishment in a community with a continuous rate. In this way, the
model results for this study depend more on the comparison between nourishment
and groin construction and the timing of each implementation, rather than the
timing of specific re-nourishment events. This is the same approach utilized by
Gopalakrishnan et al. (2016) and Janoff et al. (in prep).

3.2.2 Welfare Analysis
We calculate the net benefit for different management decisions (i.e.,
initial/delayed groin construction, initial/delayed beach nourishment, a
combination of the two, and no intervention). The net benefit for each strategy is
unique, providing a metric to compare options. The net benefit NBi for
community i is the sum of net benefits over a planning horizon (0 ≤ t ≤ T):
𝑇𝑇

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 = ∫0 (𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) − 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡)) ∙ 𝑒𝑒 −𝜌𝜌∙𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 ,

(3.4)

where Bi = the benefits, Ci = the costs, ρ = the discount factor (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1), t = time,
and T = the model time horizon. Net benefits appreciate proportional to the
discount factor, thus describing the community’s effective time horizon of
interest.
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3.2.3 Benefits
Beach width provides both a protective and a recreational value to coastal
communities (Jin et al., 2015; Landry et al., 2003; McNamara and Keeler, 2013;
McNamara et al., 2015; Pompe and Rinehart, 1995; Simmons et al., 2002). We
extend previous formulations to account for a community’s size, modeled as the
number of homes in cross-shore. This captures a community-scale perspective
rather than that of only the beachfront homes. The benefit Bi for community i is
defined as:
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) 𝛽𝛽

𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝜌𝜌 ∙ �

𝑤𝑤𝛼𝛼

� ∙ (𝑛𝑛 𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡))𝜓𝜓 ,

(3.5)

where αi = the beachfront property value and wα = a reference beach width. Note
that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝜌𝜌 = the baseline rental value, which encompasses a home’s structural and

neighborhood characteristics excluding the beach width. The above specification
assumes that benefits of shoreline protection are positively related to the number
of homes in a community. Two positive parameters β and ψ describe the effects
on Bi of unit changes in beach width and the number of rows in the community,
respectively. This relationship captures how dynamic changes in beach width
affect a property’s value, and ultimately a community’s total wealth.
The parameter ψ also captures the effect of declining value of property as
its distance from the beach increases. Typically beachfront properties are most
valuable, and properties in each subsequent row inland are less valuable (Figure
3.3). This relationship is due to diminished viewership, increased travel cost, and
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decreased recreational amenity with distance from the beach (Jin et al., 2015;
Landry and Hindsley, 2011; Pompe and Rinehart, 1995). Our model formulation
allows for the migration of beachfront benefit if property rows are lost to erosion.

Figure 3.3. Property value (PV) distribution as a function of increased distance
from the beach (property row). Normalized values illustrate proportional decrease
in price for each row inland.
3.2.4 Costs
The total cost of shoreline management Ci for community i is a sum of
engineering-related activities:
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) + 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡, 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ) ,

(3.6)

where CG,i = the cost of groin construction; CN,i = the cost of nourishment; and Ni
= the nourishment rate. In turn, we describe the groin construction cost CG,i as:
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝜙𝜙𝐺𝐺 ∙ 𝐿𝐿 ,

(3.7)
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where 𝜙𝜙𝐺𝐺 = the variable cost coefficient for rock ($/m) and L = the groin’s length
(m). This cost is a discrete event at the time of groin construction. The cost of
nourishment CN,i is:
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 (𝑡𝑡) = 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 ,

(3.8)

where 𝜙𝜙𝑁𝑁 = the variable sand cost coefficient, and Ni = the nourishment rate.

Nourishment costs are continuous across the model’s time horizon and starting at
the time of nourishment intervention.

3.2.5 Optimization
Similar to the optimal control problem presented in Janoff et al. (in
review), we compare the welfare analysis equation (3.4) for different strategies
that a community can take in response to heightened erosion due to the updrift
community’s groin. These strategies include combinations of initial groin
construction/beach nourishment, time-delayed beach nourishment/groin
construction, or no intervention. Each strategy’s corresponding effect on the
system’s natural and human components are implemented into the
morphodynamic and socioeconomic frameworks respectively, and the timing of
strategic implementation that maximizes the downdrift community’s net benefit is
considered their rational response. This net benefit maximization also includes the
optimal time at which a community will choose to nourish, build a groin, or
pursue a combination of strategies. In sum, this corresponds to an optimal control
problem, with the times of groin construction and nourishment intervention as the
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control variables tg and tn respectively, and the net benefit NB (Equation 3.4) as
the functional to be optimized:
max 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁.
𝑡𝑡𝑔𝑔 ,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛

(3.9)

We utilize a time range between zero (i.e., initial intervention) and 100 years (i.e.,
the model’s time horizon) for both the groin timing and the nourishment timing
variables, with temporal resolution of one year. Neither the range nor the
resolution affect the optimal solution. We employ a brute force approach to solve
this optimal control problem, such that we calculate the net benefit of each
combination of intervention timings and identify the combination that produces
the maximum net benefit for the downdrift community.
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3.2.6 Parameter Estimation
Table 3.1. Economic input parameters including the symbol, feasible range of
values, representative test values, units, and references.
Economic
Symbol Feasible
Units
Test
Test Value:
Parameters
Range of
Value:
Fig. 9
Values
Fig. 6, 8b
Sand Cost
ϕN
2—30
$/m3
5
5
a,d,j,m,o,r,s
Coefficient
Groin Cost
ϕG
0.8—290 $103/m
100
1—1,000
d,j,r
Coefficient
Baseline Property
α
100—650 $103
6: 0.1—
277.519
Valueb,f,h,k
650
8b: 80—
110
Number of Crossni
8—140
6: 1—120
38
shore Property
8b: 38
Rowse
Discount
ρ
0.01—0.2
yr-1
0.15
(a-b) 0.15
g,p,s
Factor
(c-d) 0.03
Hedonic
β
0.05—0.8
0.5
0.5
Parameter (Beach
Width)a,c,l,n,p
Hedonic
ψ
0.0001—
0.2
0.2
Parameter
0.8
(Property
Rows)a,b,h,i
References: aGopalakrishnan, 2010; bGopalakrishnan et al., 2011;
c
Gopalakrishnan et al., 2016; dHillyer, 1996; eInspired by field values observed in
New Jersey; fJin et al., 2015; gLandry, 2004; hLandry and Hindsley, 2011; iLandry
et al., 2003; jMcdowell Peek et al., 2016; kMunicipal financial documents; lPompe
and Rinehart, 1995; mPSDS, 2019; nSlott, 2008; oSlott et al., 2010; pSmith et al.,
2009; qUSACE, 1999; rUSACE, 2015; sWilliams et al., 2013.
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Table 3.2. Physical input parameters including the symbol, feasible range of
values, representative test values, units, and references.
Physical
Symbol Feasible Units Test Value:
Test Value:
Parameters
Range
Figs. 5—6, 8b
Fig. 9
of
Values
Background
γ
0—??
m/yr
2
0.5—10
Erosion
Ratea,g
Nourishment
Ni
2—130
103 Updrift: 8.415 Updrift: 8.415
b,m
Rate
m3/yr
Downdrift:
Downdrift:
18.614
18.614
Groin
Li
20—240
m
Updrift: 135
Updrift: 135
Lengthh,i
Downdrift:
Downdrift: 100
100
Depth of
D
5—20
m
16
16
Closured,f,l
Alongshore
K1
10—
103
500
500
Flux
1,000
m2/yr
Coefficientc,e
Cross-shore
K2
2—10
103
2
2
2
Flux
m /yr
Coefficientj,k
Shoreface
θeq
m/m
0.025
0.025
Equilibrium
Slopej,k
Alongshore
s
185—
m
300
300
h
cell length
630
Property sizeh
lot
20—60
m
30
30
Deep Water
χ
0—90
°
75
75
Wave Angleh
Deep Water
H
0.5—5
m
1
1
Wave Heighth
References: aArmstrong and Lazarus, 2019; bASBPA, 2020; cAshton et al., 2001;
d
Birkemeier, 1985; eFalqués, 2003; fHallermeier, 1980; gHapke et al., 2013;
h
Inspired by field values observed in New Jersey; iKraus and Batten, 2007;
j
Lorenzo-Trueba and Ashton, 2014; kMiselis and Lorenzo-Trueba, 2017; lOrtiz
and Ashton, 2016; mPSDS, 2019.
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3.3 Downdrift Community Responses
We compare four primary strategy responses by the downdrift community (Figure
3.4): no groin or nourishment (a), groin without nourishment (b), nourishment without
groin (c), and groin with nourishment (d). In this case, the updrift community’s strategy
is independent of the downdrift community but the downdrift community’s strategy is
conditioned upon the choice of groin construction in the updrift community. For this
analysis, we assume that the updrift community has chosen to build a groin, and thus, we
focus only on the downdrift community’s response to that groin.

Figure 3.4. Four primary responses a downdrift community can take: no nourishment or
groin (a), groin without nourishment (b), nourishment without groin (c), and nourish with
groin (d).
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If we consider delayed downdrift responses, communities might choose to nourish
and/or build a groin at any point during the model run (i.e., time-delayed intervention).
Including all possible combinations of strategies, this amounts to nine possible responses.
We include a sample shoreline time-series for each strategy combination as well as the
resultant loss of properties depending on the strategy and/or timing of intervention
(Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5. Decision matrix for downdrift community with all combinations of
initial/delayed/no beach nourishment and/or groin construction.
Using these options given to the downdrift community, we explore the model’s
predicted downdrift responses for a range of beachfront property values (a proxy for the
community’s level of wealth) and community sizes (proxied by the number of property
rows in cross-shore). We assume average updrift and downdrift groin lengths and
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nourishment rates based on field observations for this initial analysis in Figure 3.6 (as
listed in Table 3.2).
From literature, furthermore, the common assumption is that storm events have
been the main cause of intervention timing, where many field communities built groins
after damaging storms such as the one in 1920, the Great Atlantic Hurricane of 1944, and
the Ash Wednesday Storm of 1962 (Rankin, 1952; Rayner, 1952; Stauble et al., 2005;
Farrell et al., 2004b; Pilkey and Wright III, 1988; Rice, 2015; Miller, 1980; Everts et al.,
1980; Donahue et al., 2004). These observations indicate that communities have
historically responded in a very myopic manner, meaning that they likely did not consider
future storm impacts or damages associated with chronic erosion when choosing to
intervene in order to stabilize their beaches. This decision-making dynamic corresponds
with a high discount rate, which effectively shortens the time horizon across which a
community might make a management decision. Based on this qualitative evidence, we
assume a relatively high discount rate in the following analysis (Figure 3.6).
When property value is low, regardless of community size, downdrift
communities can neither build a groin nor nourish because they don’t have the adequate
financial means to do so, thus resulting in property abandonment, i.e., no groin; no
nourishment (Figure 3.6). If a community has a low property value and has a moderate
amount of property rows, it builds a groin after a time delay but does not nourish, i.e.,
delayed groin; no nourishment. Downdrift communities with moderate property values or
few cross-shore property rows respond to updrift-induced erosion by constructing a groin
at the start of the model run but without complementary nourishment, i.e., initial groin;
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no nourishment. If the community has a higher property value and is large, it is able to
build a groin initially but nourish after a time delay, i.e., initial groin; delayed
nourishment. If a community is large, wealthy, or both, it will choose both to nourish and
to build a groin as soon as possible, i.e., initial groin; initial nourishment.
This result highlights that building a groin is more easily achieved for
communities with fewer economic resources available, but that nourishing is also
achievable if community resources (i.e., higher wealth or larger tax base) are even more
readily available. Irrespective of their intervention type, however, by intervening
instantaneously, communities are able to avoid property loss associated with downdriftenhanced erosion, and instead, stabilize their shorelines over the long-run.
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Figure 3.6. Downdrift community responses as a function of baseline property values and
community sizes.

3.4 Model Comparison with Field Observations
To compare the field and model, we collect community-specific data on groin
construction and beach nourishment characteristics for two-community couplets along
the New Jersey coast, including the times of groin construction (Table A3.1) and first
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nourishment intervention (ASBPA, 2020; PSDS, 2019) in the updrift and downdrift
communities. This analysis, for the purposes of determining the updrift community,
assumes a net alongshore sediment transport direction by region, i.e., northerly transport
in central New Jersey and southerly transport in southern New Jersey (Ashley et al.,
1986).
We arrange these times of groin and nourishment interventions for each downdrift
community, listed from north to south (from left to right), and grouped by coastal county
in New Jersey (Figure 3.7). Also included are the times and names of prominent storms
that struck or affected these communities to show the relative importance of storms in
how communities have made their management decisions.
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Figure 3.7. A general timeline of groin construction and the timing of first nourishment in
downdrift New Jersey communities relative to the storms causing beach erosion and the
transition from locally-managed to federally-managed/-subsidized projects after
approximately 1960.
The model is community-centric and does not analyze the effect of federal or state
involvement (i.e., externally subsidized or planned groin/nourishment projects). After a
series of storms in the 1950s-1960s, culminating in the Ash Wednesday storm of 1962,
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The US Army Corps of Engineers responded to significant storm damages along the New
Jersey coast with emergency measures such as new groin constructions, modified existing
wooden groins with rock and cement reinforcements, and beach nourishments (Hillyer,
1996).
Following passage of the Water Resources Development Act in 1986, the federal
government has taken the leading role in designing, managing, and subsidizing many
regional beach nourishment interventions (Hillyer, 1996). This top-down policy response
plays a key role in how and when observed downdrift nourishment responses were
implemented. As such, we assume that the switch from locally-driven to federally-driven
management occurred in approximately 1960 (Hillyer, 1996). Focusing only on the
period of time prior to federal involvement, therefore, provides information on how
communities made groin management decisions isolated from the influence of external
agencies.
Most downdrift communities built groins in response to large storm events in
order to stabilize their beaches as an emergency adaptation measure, but some built
groins at points in time not closely succeeding major storms, e.g., Deal, Belmar, and Sea
Isle City (Figure 3.7). Furthermore, cases such as Deal and Belmar are particularly
interesting because they did not respond to the unnamed 1915 storm in the same way that
their fellow Monmouth County communities such as Sea Bright, Asbury Park, and
Bradley Beach did (i.e., with groin construction). Instead, Deal and Belmar waited until
1933 and 1928 respectively to construct their groins (Table A3.1). Similarly, Sea Girt did
not build groins after any of the storms during the pre-federal period, and waited until
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1962 to intervene, at which point the federal government’s role likely influenced their
decision. Altogether, this suggests that storms are not the only driver of groin
construction policy.
In fact, New Jersey’s coastal communities were at various stages of development
at the beginning of the 20th century (US Census Bureau, 2010), with the most densely
populated (i.e., many residents per meter alongshore) communities such as Asbury Park
and Bradley Beach constructing groins immediately after the 1915 storm, and less
densely populated communities such as Belmar, Deal, and Sea Girt opting to delay groin
construction (Figures 3.7, 3.8a). However, we are interested in the time at which
downdrift communities built groins relative to the date of groin construction in the updrift
community to understand how communities responded to groin-induced erosion, in
particular.
We plot the time delay in downdrift groin construction as a function of the
population density at the time of the management implementation, i.e., the preceding
decadal Census count (Figure 3.8b). These data are superimposed on the envelope of
model predictions for downdrift groin time delays based on the same population density
metric. We proxy the population density in the model by multiplying the number of
cross-shore property rows with the number of people per property (assuming two
taxpaying residents in a home) and dividing by the alongshore property length (Table
3.2). This envelope is constructed with a series of sensitivity analyses for different
baseline property values (Table 3.1), and encompasses all time-delay data points
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produced by the model for each combination of baseline property value and population
density (Figure 3.8b).

Figure 3.8. (a) Population density changes through time for each downdrift community in
New Jersey collected from the 2010 US Census counts, and (b) the comparison between
predicted time delays in downdrift groin construction relative to updrift groin
construction and observed time delays for field communities in New Jersey. Results
provide evidence that the extent of coastal development plays a role in how communities
respond to groin-induced erosion.
Field observations and model predictions both indicate that the downdrift delay in
groin construction decreases as the population density increases, highlighting that the
extent of community development is important in determining when the community
decides to intervene in the coastal zone. Furthermore, the model is capable of capturing
this population density dynamic observed in the field, and suggests that while exogenous
environmental forcings such as storms are important drivers of groin construction, the
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human component of these developed systems also serves an important role in coastal
management timing.
How these communities might respond differently in the future is of utmost
importance given the often fragmented, community-by-community management
approach that has resulted from hard structural interventions historically and the
possibility of a return to local financing of adaptation measures (Coburn, 2009).
Changing physical and economic conditions will undoubtedly force communities to
respond to groin-heightened erosion differently, the full range of which we explore in the
subsequent section, below.

3.5 Future Conditions: Effect of Higher Erosion Rates and Rock Material Costs
In the future, increased sea-level-rise rates and reductions in groin-quality rock
supplies due to the potential over-exploitation of common-pool rock resources may lead
to increased erosion rates and material costs (Hudson et al., 2015; Rich 2014). Should
these downdrift communities face such challenges in addition to the already enhanced
erosion rates they experience due to updrift groins, communities will find management
interventions more difficult to justify economically.
The model indicates that for low erosion rates and groin costs, myopic downdrift
communities respond by building a groin initially and nourishing their beach after a time
delay (Figure 3.9a). Increasing the groin cost results in delayed nourishment without a
groin for these communities because groins are too expensive to justify their marginal
benefit, and the erosion rate is low enough that delayed intervention is appropriate
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because enough properties can be preserved. Increasing only the erosion rate results in
initial groin construction without nourishment, suggesting that groins could be a more
effective approach toward stabilizing beaches compared to nourishment under higher sealevel-rise rates, given that the marginal costs are low enough to justify groin intervention.
And while this result depends on the relative balance between unit rock and sand costs,
which govern the total costs of groin construction vs. beach nourishment, the sand costs
used here ($5/m3) are relatively low, thus reinforcing the key point that groins are likely
to be the more effective management option in the future.
High erosion rates and moderate groin costs result in delayed groin construction
without nourishment in myopic communities because groins are economically infeasible
in the near term, but property preservation (and community preservation more generally)
is still feasible in the longer term. If both the groin cost and the erosion rate are too high,
however, the community can neither nourish nor build a groin at any point because it is
either too costly or too ineffective to produce any appreciable benefit for the community
(Figure 3.9a).
These community responses correspond with a progression of system behaviors
from seaward growth (i.e., property preservation due to widened beaches) for low groin
costs and/or erosion rates, slow retreat (i.e., initial property loss due to shoreline
transgression with delayed intervention) for moderate erosion rates and sand costs, and
full retreat (i.e., extensive property loss due to shoreline transgression without
intervention) for high erosion rates and sand costs (Figure 3.9b). The higher the groin
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costs or erosion rates are, the more likely the downdrift community responds with either a
groin or nourishment later and thus lose more properties in the long term.

Figure 3.9. Downdrift community responses to updrift groin-induced erosion for myopic
communities (a) and for hyperopic communities (c), and geomorphic behavioral
responses for myopic communities (b) and for hyperopic communities (d) for future
increases in groin material costs and background erosion rates.
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While communities have historically made management decisions in a myopic
manner, especially when constructing groins, there is support for lower social discounting
when adapting to sea-level rise in the future (Lincke and Hinkel, 2018; Weisbach and
Sunstein, 2009). Should downdrift communities follow a more hyperopic planning
approach, they respond to future climate change and socioeconomic conditions with only
an initial groin (no nourishment) for low rock costs, a delayed groin (no nourishment) for
moderate rock costs, and no groin or nourishment for high rock costs (Figure 3.9c). These
decisions correspond with more instances of full retreat and thus, property abandonment,
for higher rock costs than for the myopic scenario (Figure 3.9b). These results underscore
not only that how communities value the future in their planning process determines the
decisions they make and their corresponding geomorphic behaviors, but also that groins
may be a more attractive adaptation solution than beach nourishment irrespective of the
community’s discounting scheme.
In summary, under future conditions, we can expect communities downdrift of a
groin to respond in possibly different ways than we see currently, depending on the
relative balance between the physical forcing associated with sea-level rise (i.e., the
background erosion rate) and the economic forcing of resource dynamics (i.e., the rock
material cost), as well as how they plan for the future. These changes may make the
current trend of complementary hard and soft management interventions more difficult.
Furthermore, the model indicates a potential switch from soft engineering practices such
as beach nourishment (prevalent in the modern day) toward hard engineering practices
such as groins in the future due to higher erosion rates, leading to a pervasive hardening

117

of the coast until a threshold beyond which communities can no longer justify any
management intervention without help from the federal or state government. Which
decision these communities make will ultimately dictate how many properties are lost
and what the physical re-orientation of the coast will look like.

3.6 Discussion
We have developed a simple model coupling coastal geomorphology and
community-scale socioeconomics to account for emergent management decisions,
addressing the groin-induced erosion problem. Assuming that beaches provide erosion
protection and recreational value and that community size/property value serves as a
proxy for wealth, our model predicts a community’s decision (i.e., initial vs. delayed
beach nourishment and/or groin construction, or doing nothing) based on its most rational
option (i.e., most economically beneficial).
Downdrift communities have often responded to one-time storm events with groin
and nourishment interventions, suggesting that most decisions have historically been
myopic. While stochastic conditions such as storminess might help explain the specific
timing of groin or nourishment interventions, how communities decide to respond (i.e.,
with initial or delayed nourishment/groin construction) also depends on the underlying
socioeconomic and resource economic conditions at the community scale.
The model presented in this paper highlights the key parameter controls on
downdrift community responses to updrift-groin-induced erosion. These include a
community’s size (a proxy for population density) and a community’s baseline property
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value. In fact, both field observations and model predictions suggest that population
density is an important factor that helps determine when communities have built groins in
the past, which may also provide clues into how communities will respond in the future.
We find that how the community weights future vs. present benefits and costs (i.e., the
discount rate) is also an important factor in predicting downdrift community responses,
indicating that implementing a myopic vs. hyperopic decision-making scheme could
determine the evolution of developed coasts.
Looking toward the future, it will be important to incorporate the influence of
state and federal government cost-sharing agreements, coupled with behavioral controls
associated with tourism in highly commercialized regions such as New Jersey. These
additional factors likely play a role in how downdrift communities choose to respond
based on their location along the coast, their proximity to nearby tourism-concentrated
zones, and their underlying geomorphic conditions such as the physical efficiency of
nourishment or groin projects.
All of these dynamics should be explored in future work to fully understand
community-scale responses historically, and how they might change in the future due to
climate change. Our understanding of how these systems might behave in the future is
integral to the development of sustainable management policies at local, state, and federal
levels of government. For example, our model simulations suggest that the historical
transition from groins to beach nourishment as the main management response during the
late 20th century could be reversed in the future, suggesting that hard structures such as
groins could again become more commonplace as communities adapt to sea-level rise.
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Information gained from this modeling framework and scientific findings built off these
coupled geomorphic-economic explorations can provide coastal managers and
policymakers the foresight necessary to make more informed and comprehensive
decisions in the future.
In sum, this simple model replicates the observed field responses to groin-induced
erosion in downdrift communities, shedding light on the anthropogenic role in coastal
morphologic evolution. Importantly, coordination across communities is gaining
recognition as a way to incorporate unintended consequences and to redistribute risk to
avoid situations such as heightened erosion downdrift of groins. Exploring the range of
spatial relationships and behaviors requires a larger scale approach. Future work will
extend the model to account for more community and inter-community dynamics,
whether communities will maintain their status quo policies, and how external funding
will affect strategy decisions for coupled natural-human coastal systems faced with
climate change impacts such as sea-level rise and changing resource economic
conditions.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
We present the alternative end-member assumption that uncoordinated
communities make about their neighbor when choosing strategies independently, as
discussed in section (1.2.3). In contrast with the representative non-coordination
assumption presented previously, communities assume their neighbor nourishes with high
frequency here, which we consider a risky assumption. Given this expectation,
communities nourish less than they would have under coordination, resulting in full
retreat for most baseline-property-value-combinations and slow retreat when one or both
communities are wealthy (Figure A1.1b). This extreme behavioral difference results in a
maximum benefit of coordination that is an order of magnitude larger than our
representative non-coordination (Figures A1.1c, 1.7a) and corresponds with undernourishment in both communities for most of the regime space (Figure A1.1d-e).
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Figure A1.1. Emergent behaviors from (a) coordinated and (b) uncoordinated
management schemes, (c) the benefit of coordination between the two, and regions of
over-/under-nourishment in (d) community one and (e) community two. We highlight the
same baseline-property-value combination as Figure 1.7 (blue star) for sensitivity
analyses to future conditions.
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We test how these coordination regimes using the same baseline-property-value
distribution presented in figure (1.7) and represented by the blue star in figure (A1.1) will
differ under increases in background erosion rate and sand resource cost. Unsurprisingly,
uncoordinated communities operating under a risky assumption will never choose to
nourish, thereby experiencing full retreat behavior under all future conditions (Figure
A1.2b). This results in a large benefit of coordination in the near future and no benefit in
the distant future when both coordination schemes result in full retreat (Figure A1.2c).
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Figure A1.2. Emergent behaviors under future increases in background erosion rate and
sand resource cost for (a) coordinated and (b) uncoordinated communities, and (c) the
benefit of coordination between these two schemes.
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Overall, risky non-coordination results in systematic under-nourishment and thus
property abandonment under both current and future conditions. Given that many
communities along U.S. coastlines and worldwide have not behaved in this way, this
uncoordinated scheme (i.e., the risky assumption) is less common than our representative
uncoordinated scheme (i.e., the cautionary assumption). Nevertheless, we present this
end-member case to show the two boundaries between which communities might operate
when choosing beach maintenance independently, highlighting the variation of response
based on the assumptions communities make about their neighbors’ behaviors.
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Chapter 2 Appendix
A2.1. Information on Data Collection for Regression Variables
A2.1.1.

Beach Nourishment Decisions
We collect historical data on beach nourishment projects for each community that

has nourished their beach in New Jersey from Western Carolina University’s Program for
the Study of Developed Shorelines and the American Shore and Beach Preservation
Association’s beach nourishment databases. From these data, we calculate the average
nourishment volume per event and combine with re-nourishment frequency to determine
the average volume each community places on its beach per year, termed the nourishment
rate. This variable will be our dependent variable, or each community’s nourishment
decision (Table A2.1).

Table A2.1. Data for dependent variable (Nourishment Rate) and independent variables
(Average Total Beachfront Wealth—Distance to nearest inlet) for regression analyses and
descriptive statistics (i.e., minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation)
for each variable.
Beach
Location

Nourishment
Rate
(m3/yr)

Average
Total
Beachfront
Wealth
($)

Average
Beach
Revenue
($)

CommercialResidential
Ratio

Distance
to
Tourism
Center
(m)

Nourishment
Half-life
(yrs)

Sea Bright

275653.74

151042100.71

466097.08

0.22

Monmouth
Beach
Long Branch

65697.41

176474574.98

1074446.25

82800.68

364186558.96

Deal

40530.63

Asbury Park

Distance
to
nearest
inlet
(m)

1.00

0.45

0.02

3037.00

0.58

16231.00

1621443.58

0.12

1.00

10.23

12990.00

327935601.94

2012662.64

0.01

2353.00

5.22

6286.00

11872.84

75526858.36

3761387.86

0.36

1.00

3.20

4182.00

Bradley
Beach
Avon by the
Sea
Belmar

16239.54

94366573.29

1591114.22

0.06

2590.00

0.57

1567.00

18113.98

93642948.93

1705041.94

0.04

3730.00

1.38

494.00

14883.17

113284048.85

3391369.06

0.09

5295.00

3.75

8585.00

Spring Lake

20321.39

507908530.10

2546260.53

0.04

6955.00

1.27

5717.00

Sea Girt

16387.05

255854128.83

1063304.09

0.02

4672.00

1.05

3347.00

19693.00
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Manasquan

8909.67

138712427.62

1821710.23

0.07

2634.00

4.99

1245.00

Point
Pleasant
Lavallette

22253.88

143708162.06

2170550.40

0.21

1.00

1.44

37180.00

7184.97

232551547.86

903038.40

0.03

3030.00

0.70

23753.00

Seaside
Heights
Seaside Park

18566.34

56755726.12

3062188.83

0.16

1.00

1.19

20754.00

14045.32

156113234.65

2062806.96

0.03

1924.00

0.93

18773.00

Barnegat
Light
Loveladies

30100.88

186061150.31

249294.29

0.04

20900.00

1.41

827.00

36410.70

261131127.19

1669343.01

0.02

25264.00

0.55

5122.00

Harvey
Cedars
Surf City

98213.31

263791947.23

240557.63

0.01

27150.00

0.35

7090.00

42779.50

198374781.21

604863.09

0.05

32860.00

0.82

12655.00

Ship Bottom

25827.10

158246738.31

731240.99

0.10

35190.00

0.77

15299.00

Brant Beach

101101.27

506810708.39

1669343.01

0.02

35222.00

0.41

17847.00

Beach
Haven
Holgate

29225.17

223980865.46

567008.43

0.07

27440.00

0.54

25755.00

54567.97

161468655.57

1669343.01

0.02

25540.00

0.55

28111.00

Brigantine

69688.88

344656768.45

1226638.72

0.03

7600.00

0.41

5885.00

Atlantic City

156308.56

321989746.17

1087542.78

0.56

1.00

0.31

1606.00

Ventnor

41974.62

183697813.87

341249.37

0.04

5308.00

0.79

6909.00

Margate

6595.27

310248403.33

372142.27

0.02

7928.00

2.50

8856.00

Longport

3968.64

308564359.65

240089.47

0.00

10273.00

1.37

11955.00

Ocean City

297715.09

6486481.29

0.04

16354.00

1.49

3656.00

Sea Isle City

55704.98

1094929077.2
7
689434843.20

2024539.93

0.03

22840.00

0.99

6808.00

Avalon

68726.67

1199899.71

0.02

15915.00

1.26

1904.00

Stone
Harbor
North
Wildwood
Cape May
City
Cape May
Point

48396.22

1008771169.1
0
600117161.76

1150186.64

0.04

8624.00

0.76

9105.00

19890.35

252069155.62

1135611.60

0.09

1858.00

0.46

1785.00

89845.81

308602653.23

4637839.47

0.20

1.00

0.77

3915.00

25751.90

116868953.73

171115.97

0.00

6010.00

0.77

9136.00

Descriptive Stats
Min

3968.64

56755726.12

171115.97

0.00

1.00

0.31

494.00

Max

297715.09

6486481.29

0.56

35222.00

10.23

37180.00

Mean

55321.53

1094929077.2
7
296796545.78

1620792.94

0.08

10528.66

1.55

10429.23

Median

30100.88

232551547.86

1226638.72

0.04

5308.00

0.82

7090.00

Standard
Deviation

66853.51

238512484.84

1347699.71

0.11

11453.77

1.94

8943.65
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A2.1.2.

Socioeconomics: Beachfront Wealth
Most previous literature assumes that beachfront property value is a singular

control on nourishment decisions. We build off this assumption and extend this variable
to include beachfront wealth, or the sum of all beachfront property values alongshore in a
community. This scale is consistent with our dependent variable, the nourishment rate,
which includes the alongshore length of these nourishment projects. Furthermore, the
beachfront wealth serves as a proxy for the tax base, such that communities with more
beachfront properties will have larger revenues with which to fund such beach
nourishments.
We approximate beachfront wealth from each municipality’s publicly available
financial documents on their respective government websites, including their annual
budgets and audits. Each year, communities report their aggregate assessment value for
the entire community. From the United States Census Bureau (2010), we collect land
areas and number of housing units for each community, which provides an estimate of
the average lot size, i.e., land area / # housing units = mean property square footage. The
square root of this square footage then provides us with one dimension of the lot size,
termed the average property length.
Dividing the land area by the alongshore length of the community, collected with
Google Earth Pro, provides a representative cross-shore community width, or the
landward extent of the community. We can then divide this cross-shore width by the
average property length to determine the number of properties in cross-shore (i.e., inland
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extent of development). We then assume a power law relationship between total crossshore property value (TPV) and a property’s distance from the ocean, such that
TPV=α∙nψ, which treats beachfront property value α as the highest value in the crosssection, and each successive landward row n declines in value based on the hedonic
parameter ψ.
If we divide the aggregate assessment value by the community’s alongshore
length, this gives us a cross-sectional total assessment value, and divided by the number
of rows gives us the average assessment value per house per meter alongshore. We can
then back-calculate the beachfront property value α using the number of cross-shore
property rows (i.e., n = cross-shore width / average property length), the cross-sectional
total property value TPV, and a representative ψ value (e.g., psi = 0.7).
Given that we have inferred the beachfront property value per meter alongshore
and that the alongshore community length is known, we can determine the total
beachfront wealth that encompasses all beachfront property values. We gather these data
for as many years as are publicly available on each municipality’s website, correct for
dollar value changes through time (i.e., inflation), and take the average of all years
collected. This average beachfront wealth serves as the representative socioeconomic
metric in our regression analysis.

A2.1.3.

Tourism
New Jersey’s beaches generate approximately $12.1 billion annually in revenue

(Klein et al., 2004). As such, the amount of revenue realized by communities likely
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factors into their beach management decisions, both directly and indirectly. We test this
metric directly using information on each community’s annual beach revenue, but also
test how the extent of local tourism or the proximity to nearby tourism-concentrated
towns indirectly affects their consequent nourishment decisions.

Beach Revenue from Recreation
We gather data on the recreational revenues each community collects on its beach
from annual financial documents including audits and budgets found on each
municipality’s website. From these documents, we gather revenue generated within the
beach utility budget from various sources, including beach badge (access fee) sales,
parking meter receipts, concession rents, boardwalk tramcar leases, and local tourism
taxes. Together, these revenues represent the amount of money that users spend at the
beach over the course of each summer, providing an implicit willingness to pay for beach
recreation.
We gather these data for a wide time range as determined by the availability of
financial documents on each municipality’s website, which in some cases includes up to
20 years. These annual data are time-corrected for inflation such that all revenues are
converted to a single year’s dollar value. To correct for any bias introduced by weatherrelated variation from one summer to the next, we take the average beach revenue for all
years, which provides a representative value of their beach recreation.

Commercial vs. Residential Value Ratio
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From the New Jersey MODIV database encompassed within the State’s Open
Public Records System (Monmouth County Clerk, 2020), we collect parcel-level property
information for each community including assessment values and property classes. 3 From
these data, we group properties by class and sum all assessed values for commercial and
residential classes respectively. The ratio of the total commercial to residential
assessment values is between zero and one, and serves as a metric for the proportion of
local tourism in a town. We assume that since many of a New Jersey’s beach
communities are seasonal, most or all businesses are affected by or dependent on the
influx of summer tourists, and thus, the total commercial assessment value serves as a
proxy for the relative importance of the local tourism economy.

Data collected on assessed property values are in year 2020 dollar values (Monmouth County Clerk,
2020)

3
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Proximity to Tourism Centers
Using the commercial-residential ratio above, we define a community to be
tourism-dominated, termed a tourism center, if their ratio is greater than 0.1, or 10%
commercial value of residential value. All communities below this threshold are
considered residential-dominated. We calculate the distance from the center of each
residential-dominated community to the nearest tourism center. This metric provides
information on the spatial extent of tourism’s impact on non-local beach management
decisions, including any alongshore spillover from tourism-related beach visits in cases in
which residential-dominated communities are adjacent or in close proximity to tourismdominated communities.

A2.1.4.

Geomorphology: Site and Regional Characteristics
In addition to the various economic factors listed in the previous sections (A2.1.2-

A2.1.3), other site- and region-specific physical characteristics interact with and reshape
management interventions in the coastal environment. These underlying conditions can
limit or supply sediment to the beach and nearshore environment, thereby affecting and
possibly controlling future management decisions. To test this effect, we gather data on
the following two metrics: beach nourishment efficiency (i.e., a nourishment project’s
half-life); and a community’s downdrift distance from the nearest tidal inlet updrift (a
proxy for the natural sediment supply or deficit as a result of ebb-tidal delta dynamics
and wave refraction/shadowing).
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Beach Nourishment Efficiency
We collect data on beach nourishment efficiency using CoastSat, a shoreline
extraction tool that gathers imagery from publicly available satellite data (Vos et al.,
2019). This tool employs a machine-learning algorithm that automatically detects ocean
and terrestrial pixels from Landsat 5, 7, and 8 and Sentinel 2 satellite imagery and
estimates the shoreline location as the land-sea boundary between these classes. Casting
transects provides information on shoreline evolution through time. We average these
position changes across all transects to dampen any meter-scale patterns or perturbations
in shoreline change.
We then correct these position changes relative to a representative beach width
calculated using Google Earth Pro for a specific date in our time-series, i.e., beach area
for date X / alongshore community length = beach width for date X. We can then track
the change in average beach width through time, and plot the 50-point moving mean to
dampen day-scale wave climate effects on beach morphodynamics (Figure A2.1).
Combined with the years in which communities nourished, known from the
ASBPA/PSDS datasets, we can pinpoint the seaward extent of a community’s
nourishment project and track the decay of this nourishment sand through time.
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Figure A2.1. 50-point beach width moving mean time-series for a representative
community, Beach Haven.
This information from multiple beach nourishments can then be used to determine
a representative decay rate, and thus, the half-life of a nourishment project in a
community (Figure A2.2). We assume this metric is a proxy for the nourishment
efficiency because it provides information on how long a community can expect to retain
its artificially added beach sand, which will inform their future actions in terms of the
volume it should place and frequency of re-nourishment to adequately maintain its beach
over the long-term.
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Figure A2.2. Fraction of volume remaining through time with decay rate and half-life
information.
We use this approach to calculate the nourishment project’s half-life for each
community in our dataset.

Natural Alongshore Sediment Supply: Downdrift Distance from Nearest Tidal Inlet
While previous work tested a community’s distance from tidal inlets to
understand its access to sediment resources as an economic effect on the decision-making
process (Qiu et al., 2020), here, we explore the morphodynamic effects of inlet proximity,
and specifically, the natural supply or limitation of sediments to the beach system via
alongshore fluxes. Toward this, we calculate each community’s distance downdrift of its
nearest updrift tidal inlet, assuming that communities closer to tidal inlets will be more
affected by inlet dynamics and the consequent sediment flux variability, while
communities further downdrift of tidal inlets will be more isolated from the
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hydro/morphodynamics. This serves not only as a metric of sediment availability but also
of both local and non-local geophysical characteristics.

A2.2. Regression Results for Lognormal and Log-log Model Specifications
A2.2.1. Lognormal Regression
The second model specification we test is the lognormal regression. We run this
model with the forward, backward, and stepwise process to determine the set of
significant parameters that best explain the nourishment rate. We also test all model
combinations and isolate the model with the lowest root mean square error (RMSE),
which represents the most accurate model fit of all possible models with our vector of
independent variables X.
All regression selection processes suggest the same set of parameters can predict
the log of the nourishment output, producing similar qualitative results as the normal
model: 1) the total beachfront wealth; 2) the commercial-residential assessment value
ratio; and 3) the distance from the nearest tourism center (i.e., nearest community with
commercial-residential ratio > 0.1). We find that this model is statistically significant
using the ANOVA test and that each parameter estimate is significant at the 95%
confidence level (Table A2.2).
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Table A2.2. ANOVA results and parameter estimates for lognormal model (beachfront
wealth, com-res ratio, tourism center distance).

In general, as a community’s total beachfront wealth increases, as its share of
commercial real estate value increases, or as the community’s distance from the nearest
tourism center increases, the community will nourish more per year. This suggests that
socioeconomics and local tourism both have a positive linear impact on nourishment
policy, while proximity to tourism has an inverse relationship with beach nourishment.
This latter result could be indicative of the free riding effect whereby communities
immediately adjacent to tourism centers require less nourishment since neighboring
tourism-dominated community nourishment rates are so high. This also implies that
tourism can play a significant role in how a community manages its beach in multiple
ways and that these various effects likely interact with beachfront wealth differently in
driving nourishment choices.
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We test the model’s collinearity among parameters and find that the beachfront
wealth and the distance from the nearest tourism center are collinear, indicating that some
of the variation in response could be explained by both variables (Table A2.3). In
general, as the distance from high tourism zones increases, so too does the beachfront
wealth, which suggests that tourism might be a disamenity to residential property values,
and reinforces the theory that tourism-dominant and residential-dominant communities
are categorically different and likely behave differently.

Table A2.3. Collinearity diagnostics for lognormal model with beachfront wealth and
com-res ratio.

Observed nourishment rates for the lognormal model do not align as well with
predicted nourishment rates as the normal model, and more variability can only be
explained by the regression error (Adjusted R-square = 0.29, Figure A2.3).
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Figure A2.3. Observed vs. predicted nourishment rates for lognormal model with
adjusted R-square statistics.
Using the same approach described in equation (2.5), the standardized lognormal
model indicates that the order of variable importance is: 1) total beachfront wealth; 2)
commercial-residential assessment value ratio; and 3) distance from the nearest tourism
center (Table A2.4). These results complement the standardized normal model’s outcome
that while socioeconomics is still the primary control on nourishment policies, tourism
also plays a significant role.
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Table A2.4. Parameter estimates for the standardized lognormal model, where the total
beachfront wealth is most important, the commercial-residential ratio is second most
important, and the tourism distance is third most important.

A2.2.2.

Log-log Regression

The third model specification we test is the log-log regression. We run this model with
the forward, backward, and stepwise process to determine the set of significant
parameters that best explain the nourishment rate. We also test all model combinations
and isolate the model with the lowest root mean square error (RMSE), which represents
the most accurate model fit of all possible models with our vector of independent
variables X.
All regression processes suggest the same set of parameters can predict the log of
nourishment output: the log of total beachfront wealth, the log of tourism distance, and
the log of nourishment half-life. We find that this model is statistically significant using
the ANOVA test and that each parameter estimate is significant at the 95% confidence
level (Table A2.5).
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Table A2.5. ANOVA results and parameter estimates for the log-log model (log wealth,
log tourism distance, log half-life).

In general, as a community’s total beachfront wealth increases, its nourishment
rate increases. It’s nourishment rate also increases as it’s distance from a tourism center
or as its half-life increases. This suggests that communities in close proximity to tourism
centers or those that are tourism centers will nourish more than communities further from
these recreation-centric locations.
This model is also the first indication of our various model specifications that
underlying nourishment efficiency is a significant determinant of nourishment policy,
such that more efficient projects allow communities to nourish less, and reduced
efficiency could drive communities to nourish more than they otherwise would have. Of
note, however, there is likely a feedback between nourishment efficiency and rate
whereby higher rates shift shorelines further seaward into deeper water, thus steepening
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the shoreface and alongshore gradients in sediment transport, which would increase
cross-shore and alongshore fluxes, reduce nourishment efficiency, and necessitate higher
re-nourishment rates in the future. Alas, the relationship between nourishment half-life
and nourishment rate might be endogenous by nature.
The two site-specific variables that are significant in this model (i.e., the tourism
distance and the nourishment half-life) suggest that spatial variation is important in how
communities interact with their natural environment.
We test the model’s collinearity among parameters and find that none of the
parameters are collinear, meaning that no independent variables are correlated (Table
A2.6).

Table A2.6. Collinearity diagnostics for log-log model with log wealth, log tourism
distance, and log half-life.

Observed nourishment rates for the log-log model align the best of all model
specifications with predicted nourishment rates, and less of the nourishment rate variation
can be explained by the model’ error term (Adjusted R-square = 0.38, Figure A2.4).
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Figure A2.4. Observed vs. predicted nourishment rates for log-log model with adjusted
R-square statistics.
Finally, applying equation (2.1), the standardized log-log model indicates that the
order of variable importance is: 1) total beachfront wealth; 2) distance from the nearest
tourism center; and 3) nourishment half-life (Table A2.7). These results highlight that
while socioeconomics and tourism help explain nourishment decisions, so too do
underlying geomorphic conditions that affect nourishment project efficiency.
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Table A2.7. Parameter estimates for the standardized log-log model, where the total
beachfront wealth is most important, the tourism distance is second most important, and
the nourishment half-life is third most important.

A2.3. Justification for using the Normal Regression as the Representative Model
We choose the normal regression as the representative model because it has the highest
adjusted R-square value of the three model specifications while only including
explanatory variables that are independent of the nourishment rate. While the log-log
model has a higher adjusted R-square value than the normal model, this regression
include the nourishment half-life as an explanatory variable, which is difficult to
implement into the geo-economic model given that we do not have information on why
the sand is eroding from the beach or where it is depositing. Within the deterministic
model framework, a nourishment project’s efficiency can be affected by the diffusivity
(which governs alongshore sediment transport), the shoreface response rate (which
governs cross-shore sediment transport), or the background erosion rate associated with
the sea-level-rise rate and wave climate. All of these processes/forcings can affect the
nourishment half-life, and without information on the key controls on efficiency, we
cannot estimate where the nourishment sand will deposit within/outside of the system.
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In addition, the half-life likely is not only a predictor of nourishment rate, but
could also be dependent upon nourishment rate. As communities place more sand on their
beaches per year, shorelines would prograde seaward rapidly and into deeper water, and
given the intrinsic time lag between shoreline and shoreface toe evolutions, these effects
would steepen the shoreface and potentially reduce the emergent efficiency. Furthermore,
the rapid growth of the shoreline in one location relative to the adjacent coastline would
increase the alongshore gradient, thereby increasing sediment transport rates from the
nourishment site and reducing the nourishment efficiency. In both scenarios, the
nourishment half-life might depend, in part, on the nourishment rate, thus describing an
endogenous feedback between the two system components. As such, we avoid any
regression models with nourishment half-life as a significant predictor of nourishment
response.
While the log-log model produces the highest adjusted R-square value, it includes
the variable for nourishment efficiency, so we instead implement the regression model
with the second highest adjusted R-square value, the normal regression model, which
includes the beachfront wealth and the commercial-residential ratio as predictors of
nourishment rate.
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A2.4. Table of Input Parameters used in Geo-economic Model
Table A2.8. Physical and economic input parameters including the symbol, feasible range
of values, representative test values, units, and references.
Parameters
Symbol Feasible Test
Test Value: Units
References
Range of Value: Figs.
Values Fig. 18 19—21
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
3
Variable Nourishment
5—30
5
5—20
ϕN
$/m
2010; Hillyer, 1996;
Mcdowell Peek et al.,
Cost
2016; PSDS, 2019;
Discount Rate

ρ

1—10

3

3

%/yr

Hedonic Parameter
(Beach Width)

β

0.05—
0.8

0.6

0.6

-

Hedonic Parameter
(# cross-shore
properties)

ψ

0.0001— 0.2
0.8

0.2

-

Background Erosion
Rate

γ

0—10

0.5

0.5—4

m/yr

Depth of Closure

D

5—20

16

16

M

Alongshore Flux
Coefficient

K1

10 —
1,000

500

500

1,000
m2/yr

Cross-shore Flux
Coefficient

K2

-

2,000

2,000

m2/yr

Shoreface Equilibrium
Slope

θeq

-

0.02

0.02

m/m

Alongshore Community s
Length (Cell Length)

-

5,000

5,000

m

Number of cross-shore
property rows

-

10

10

-

n

Slott et al., 2010;
Williams et al., 2013
Landry, 2004; Smith
et al., 2009; USACE,
1999; Williams et al.,
2013
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
2010;
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
2016; Pompe and
Rinehart, 1995; Slott,
2008; Smith et al.,
2009
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
2010;
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
2011; Landry and
Hindsley, 2011;
Landry et al., 2003
Armstrong et al.,
2019;
Gopalakrishnan et al.,
2010; Hapke et al.,
2013; Murray et al.,
2013; Williams et al.
2013; Zhang et al.,
2004
Birkemeier, 1985;
Brutsché et al., 2014;
Hallermeier, 1981;
Kraus and Batten,
2007; Kraus et al.,
1995; Ortiz and
Ashton, 2016
Ashton et al., 2001;
Ashton and Murray,
2006a; Ashton and
Murray, 2006b;
Falqués, 2003
Lorenzo-Trueba and
Ashton, 2014;
Miselis and LorenzoTrueba, 2017; Ortiz
and Ashton, 2016
Lorenzo-Trueba and
Ashton, 2014;
Miselis and LorenzoTrueba, 2017; Ortiz
and Ashton, 2016
Inspired by field
values observed in
New Jersey
Inspired by field
values observed in
New Jersey
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Chapter 3 Appendix
Table A1. Field observations from New Jersey communities downdrift of groins that
respond with either contemporaneous or delayed groin/nourishment interventions of their
own. These data include the year the interventions occurred, the timing relative to the
updrift community’s groin construction, the groin lengths and nourishment rates
normalized to a 300-meter alongshore cell length (as employed by the model),
socioeconomic parameters such as the baseline property value and the community size,
and the resultant shoreline behavior observed between 1899 and 2012.
Community:
Downdrift
(Updrift)

Groin
Construction
Year:
Downdrift
(Updrift)

First Nourishment
Year: Downdrift
(Updrift)

Groin
Length*
[m]:
Downdrift
(Updrift)

Nourish
Rate*
[m3/yr]:
Downdrift
(Updrift)

Downdrift
Baseline
PV* [$]

Downdrift
# Property
Rows

Groin
Delay
[yrs]

Nourish
Delay
[yrs]

References

Sea Bright
(Monmouth
Beach)

1915
(1915)

1962
(1963)

46
(32)

21388
(11192)

104577

9

0

47

Deal
(Allenhurst)

1933
(1921)

2016
(-)

157
(102)

128891
(-)

489775

21

12

95

Asbury Park
(Ocean
Grove)

1915
(1915)

2001
(-)

172
(203)

11023
(-)

197589

116

0

86

Bradley
Beach (Avon
by the Sea)

1915
(1915)

1958
(1947)

131
(239)

4540
(7040)

251950

49

0

43

Belmar
(Spring
Lake)

1928
(1919)

1967
(1959)

105
(173)

3126
(2652)

193679

45

9

48

Sea Girt
(Manasquan)

1962
(1939)

1962
(1999)

123
(131)

4236
(6764)

590139

35

23

23

Loveladies
(Harvey
Cedars)

1963
(1925)

1962
(1954)

97
(96)

4706
(11869)

301155

23

38

37

Ship Bottom
(Surf City)

1963
(1920)

1956
(1962)

76
(69)

4726
(8233)

285581

29

43

36

Holgate
(Beach
Haven)

1947
(1920)

1962
(1962)

119
(66)

11406
(4172)

301155

23

27

42

ASBPA, 2020;
Dallas et al., 2013;
Donohue et al.,
2004; NJDEP,
n.d.; Pilkey and
Wright III, 1988;
PSDS, 2019;
Rankin, 1952;
Rice, 2015; US
Census Bureau
2010
ASBPA, 2020;
Messaros et al.,
2018; NJDEP,
n.d.; PSDS, 2019;
USACE, 1988; US
Census Bureau,
2010
ASBPA, 2020,
Farrell et al.,
2004b; NJDEP,
n.d.; PSDS, 2019;
Rankin, 1952;
Rice, 2015;
Stauble et al.,
2005; US Census
Bureau, 2010
ASBPA, 2020;
Donahue et al.,
2004; Farrell et al.,
2004b; NJDEP,
n.d.; PSDS, 2019;
Rice, 2015;
Stauble et al.,
2005; US Census
Bureau, 2010
ASBPA, 2020;
Farrell et al.,
2004b; NJDEP,
n.d.; PSDS, 2019;
Rayner, 1952;
USACE, 1995; US
Census Bureau,
2010
ASBPA, 2020;
Farrell et al.,
2004b; NJDEP,
n.d.; PSDS, 2019;
Rayner, 1952;
Stauble et al.,
2005; US Census
Bureau, 2010
ASBPA, 2020,
Miller 1980,
NJDEP n.d., PSDS
2019, Rice 2015,
USACE 1999, US
Census Bureau
2010
ASBPA 2020,
Miller 1980,
NJDEP n.d., PSDS
2019, Rice 2015,
USACE 1999, US
Census Bureau
2010
ASBPA 2020;
Miller, 1980;
NJDEP, n.d.;
PSDS, 2019; Rice,
2015; USACE,
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1999; US Census
Bureau, 2010

Ventnor City
(Atlantic
City)

(1948)

2004
(1936)

(200)

26195
(8604)

269197

75

-

56

Sea Isle City
(Strathmere)

1923
(1920)

1962
(1950)

130
(136)

3128
(13145)

345432

25

3

42

South Cape
May (Cape
May City)

(1924)

(1967)

(114)

(10478)

-

-

-

-

ASBPA, 2020;
NJDEP, n.d.;
PSDS, 2019;
Rankin, 1952; US
Census Bureau,
2010
ASBPA, 2020;
Everts et al., 1980;
NJDEP, n.d.;
PSDS, 2019;
USACE, 1978;
USACE, 2001; US
Census Bureau,
2010
NJDEP, n.d.;
Tischler, 2006

*Value normalized to a 300-meter compartment size for comparison amongst
communities.
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Codes
A4.1 Chapter 1
All field observations, model codes, data produced by model experiments, and scripts
used to generate manuscript figures are available at our Github repository page
https://github.com/aryejanoff/Nourishment-Coordination.
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A4.2 Chapter 2
A4.2.1 SAS Codes
NJ_nourishmentrate.sas (Normal Regression Model)
/*Nourishment Rate*/
libname NJ '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJ.nrate
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJ.nrate;
log_rate=log(Nourishment_Rate);
log_BR=log(Average_Beach_Revenue);
log_wealth=log(Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth);
log_tourdist=log(Distance_to_Tourism_Center);
log_inletdist=log(Distance_to_nearest_inlet);
log_halflife=log(Nourishment_Half_life);
proc contents;
proc print;
proc corr data=a;
var Nourishment_Rate log_rate Nourishment_Half_life log_halflife;
run;
proc reg outest=est1;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out1 p=p r=r; run; quit;
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proc reg outest=est2;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out2 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est3;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
output out=out3 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
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proc reg outest=est5;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4 est5; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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NJ_lognourishmentrate.sas (Semilog Regression Model)
/*Nourishment Rate*/
libname NJln '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJln.nrateln
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJln.nrateln;
log_rate=log(Nourishment_Rate);
log_BR=log(Average_Beach_Revenue);
log_wealth=log(Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth);
log_tourdist=log(Distance_to_Tourism_Center);
log_inletdist=log(Distance_to_nearest_inlet);
log_halflife=log(Nourishment_Half_life);
proc contents;
proc print;
proc reg outest=est1;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out1 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est2;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
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model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out2 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est3;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
output out=out3 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est5;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
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model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4 est5; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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NJ_lognourishmentrate_logparams.sas (Log-log Regression Model)
/*Nourishment Rate*/
libname NJlnln '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJlnln.nratelnln
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJlnln.nratelnln;
log_rate=log(Nourishment_Rate);
log_BR=log(Average_Beach_Revenue);
log_wealth=log(Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth);
log_tourdist=log(Distance_to_Tourism_Center);
log_inletdist=log(Distance_to_nearest_inlet);
log_halflife=log(Nourishment_Half_life);
proc contents;
proc print;
proc reg outest=est1;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out1 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est2;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
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*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out2 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est3;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
output out=out3 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est5;
*model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Beach_Revenue
Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center
Distance_to_nearest_inlet Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
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*model log_rate = Average_Beach_Revenue Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth
Com_Res_Ratio Distance_to_Tourism_Center Distance_to_nearest_inlet
Nourishment_Half_life / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
model log_rate = log_BR log_wealth Com_Res_Ratio log_tourdist log_inletdist
log_halflife / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4 est5; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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NJ_nourishmentdischarge_standardized.sas (Standard Normal Regression Model)
/*Nourishment Discharge*/
libname NJst '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJst.ndischargest
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs_standardln.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJst.ndischargest;
proc contents;
proc print;
proc corr data=a;
var Standard_Dischargeln Standard_Half_life;
run;
proc reg outest=est3;
model Standard_Discharge = Standard_BR Standard_Wealth Standard_CR_Ratio
Standard_Tourism_Distance Standard_Inlet_Distance Standard_Half_life / white collin
slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=stepwise ss2 sse aic;
output out=out3 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
model Standard_Discharge = Standard_BR Standard_Wealth Standard_CR_Ratio
Standard_Tourism_Distance Standard_Inlet_Distance Standard_Half_life / white collin
slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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NJ_geointeractions_sppcombos.sas (Half-life Geo-interaction)
/*Nourishment Rate*/
libname NJ '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJ.geointeract
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJ.geointeract;
proc contents;
proc print;
run;
proc reg outest=est1;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
CR_Half_life_Div / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out1 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est2;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
CR_Half_life_Div / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out2 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
CR_Half_life_Div / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est5;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
CR_Half_life_Div / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4 est5; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
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proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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NJ_geointeractions_sppcombos.sas (Inlet Distance Geo-interaction)
/*Nourishment Rate*/
libname NJ '/folders/myfolders/Projects';
/***State***/
PROC IMPORT OUT= NJ.geointeract
DATAFILE= "/folders/myfolders/Projects/NJ_SAS_inputs.xlsx"
DBMS=XLSX REPLACE;
SHEET="Sheet1";
data a;
set NJ.geointeract;
proc contents;
proc print;
run;
proc reg outest=est1;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
Wealth_logInlet_Mult / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=forward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out1 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est2;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
Wealth_logInlet_Mult / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=backward ss2 sse aic;
output out=out2 p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est4;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
Wealth_logInlet_Mult / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
proc reg outest=est5;
model Nourishment_Rate = Average_Total_Bfrnt_Wealth Com_Res_Ratio
Wealth_logInlet_Mult / white collin slstay=0.15 slentry=0.15
noint selection=adjrsq sse aic adjrsq;
output out=out p=p r=r; run; quit;
data both; set est4 est5; run;
proc sort data=both; by _rmse_; run;
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proc print data=both(obs=10); run;
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A4.2.2 Matlab Codes
maincode.m
function [behavior,NB2,W,Eff,Nrate]=maincode(PV,comres)
% %Nourishment Rate Sensitivities
% Nrate_min=0;
% Nrate_max=300000;
% dN=100;
% Nrate_vector=Nrate_min:dN:Nrate_max;
% nr=length(Nrate_vector);
% NB_storage=NaN(1,nr);
% behavior_storage=NaN(1,nr);
% N_efficiency_storage=NaN(1,nr);
%
% parfor iN=1:numel(Nrate_vector)
%% Input Physical Pmarameters %%
lot_size=30;
w_init=30;
beta=0.6; %beach width hedonic parameter
%
PV=0.01e6;
%
comres=0.0;
alpha2=PV/(w_init^beta); %385000; %
s=[2500 5000 2500]; %alongshore compartment length (m)
rows_along=s(2)/lot_size;
rows_cross=10; %# of cross-shore proeprty rows
properties_total=rows_cross*rows_along;
comm_width=rows_cross*lot_size; %initial Community Width (m)
psi=0.2;
D=16; %depth of closure (m)
gamma=1; %erosion rate (m/yr)
d=500000; %alongshore flux coeff
K=2000; %cross-shore flux coeff
phi=20; %sand cost ($/m^3)
rho=0.03; %discount rate
TBW=PV*rows_along;
Nrate=max(0,-7800.23119+0.00015081*TBW+223965*comres); %Nourishment
Rate Nrate_vector(iN); %
nu=0; %beach width decline beyond max threshold
theta_eq=0.02; %equilibrium shoreface slope
k2=0;
k3=0;
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%% Computational Parameters %%
tmax=50; dt=0.01; t=0:dt:tmax; n=length(t);
Smax=3; ds=1; S=1:ds:Smax; m=length(S);
A2=alpha2*rho;
theta=zeros(n,m); qL=zeros(n,m); qC=zeros(n,m); q_loss=zeros(1,n);
fS=zeros(n,m); fT=zeros(n,m);
xS=zeros(n,m); xT=zeros(n,m); xH=zeros(n,m); w=zeros(n,m);
B=zeros(n,m); B_disc=zeros(n,m); TB=zeros(n,m);
C=zeros(n,m); TC=zeros(n,m);
nb=NaN(n,m); N_h=zeros(n,m);
volume=zeros(n,m);
V_nourish=zeros(1,n); V_loss=zeros(1,n); efficiency=zeros(1,n);
TQL_out=zeros(1,n); TQC_out=zeros(1,n); TQ_out=zeros(1,n);
nb2=NaN(1); nb3=NaN(1); behavior=NaN(1); NB2=NaN(1); NB3=NaN(1);
TNB=NaN(1);
%% Initial Conditions %%
xS(1,:)=comm_width+w_init;
xT(1,:)=xS(1,:)+(D/theta_eq);
xH(1,:)=comm_width;
N_h(1,:)=rows_cross;
w(1,:)=xS(1,:)-xH(1,:);
volume(:,2)=Nrate;
%% Main Code %%
for i=1:n-1
for j=2:m-1
%% Nourishment Initiation + Volume
V_nourish(i+1)=V_nourish(i)+(2*(volume(i,2))/(s(2)*D));
%% Fluxes (Along/Cross-shore) and Shoreface Dynamics
qL(i,j)=d*((xS(i,j-1)-xS(i,j))/((s(j-1)+s(j))/2)); qL(i,1)=d*((xS(i,m)xS(i,1))/((s(j-1)+s(j))/2)); qL(i,m)=d*((xS(i,m-1)-xS(i,m))/((s(m-1)+s(m))/2));
theta(i,j)=D/(xT(i,j)-xS(i,j)); theta(i,1)=D/(xT(i,1)-xS(i,1));
theta(i,m)=D/(xT(i,m)-xS(i,m));
qC(i,j)=K*(theta(i,j)-theta_eq); qC(i,1)=K*(theta(i,1)-theta_eq);
qC(i,m)=K*(theta(i,m)-theta_eq);
q_loss(i)=((2*(qL(i,1)-qL(i,2)))/s(j))+((4*(qC(i,2)+qC(i,3)))/D)+gamma; %
V_loss(i)=(dt/3)*(q_loss(1)+4*(sum(q_loss(2:2:end)))+2*sum(q_loss(2:1:end))+q_loss(e
nd));
efficiency(i)=100*(1-V_loss(i)./V_nourish(i));
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%% ODE's ((2*d/(s^2))*(xS(i,m)-2*xS(i,1)+xS(i,2)))-(4*K*(theta(i,1)theta_eq)/D)
fT(i,j)=(4*K*(theta(i,j)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma; fT(i,1)=(4*K*(theta(i,1)theta_eq)/D)-gamma; fT(i,m)=(4*K*(theta(i,m)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma;
fS(i,j)=((2*d/(((s(j-1)+s(j))/2)*((s(j)+s(j+1))/2)))*(xS(i,j-1)2*xS(i,j)+xS(i,j+1)))-(4*K*(theta(i,j)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma+((2*volume(i,2))/(D*s(2)));
fS(i,1)=((2*d/(((s(m)+s(1))/2)*((s(1)+s(2))/2)))*(xS(i,m)-2*xS(i,1)+xS(i,2)))(4*K*(theta(i,1)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma; fS(i,m)=((2*d/(((s(m1)+s(m))/2)*((s(m)+s(1))/2)))*(xS(i,m-1)-2*xS(i,m)+xS(i,1)))-(4*K*(theta(i,m)theta_eq)/D)-gamma;
%% Numerical Approximations
xT(i+1,j)=xT(i,j)+dt*fT(i,j); xT(i+1,1)=xT(i,1)+dt*fT(i,1);
xT(i+1,m)=xT(i,m)+dt*fT(i,m);
xS(i+1,1)=xS(i,1)+dt*fS(i,1); xS(i+1,j)=xS(i,j)+dt*fS(i,j);
xS(i+1,m)=xS(i,m)+dt*fS(i,m);
if xS(i,j)<=lot_size
volume(i,j)=0; volume(i+1,j)=0; N_h(i,j)=0; xH(i,j)=0; N_h(i+1,j)=0;
xH(i+1,j)=0; %xS(i,j)=0; xS(i+1,j)=0;
elseif xS(i,j)<=xH(i,j)+0.5
xH(i+1,j)=xH(i,j)-lot_size; N_h(i+1,j)=N_h(i,j)-1;
else
xH(i+1,j)=xH(i,j);
end
w(i,j)=xS(i,j)-xH(i,j); w(i,1)=xS(i,1)-xH(i,1);
%% Housing Lines
N_h(i,j)=xH(i,j)/lot_size; N_h(i,1)=xH(i,1)/lot_size;
N_h(i,m)=xH(i,m)/lot_size;
%% Benefit
B(i,2)=rows_along*A2*((w(i,2)).^beta)*((N_h(i,2)).^psi)-(nu*(w(i,2).^2));
B_disc(i,j)=B(i,j)*exp(-rho*t(i));
TB(i,j)=(dt/3)*(B_disc(1,j)+4*(sum(B_disc(2:2:end,j)))+2*sum(B_disc(2:1:end,j))+B_di
sc(end,j));
%% Cost
C(i,j)=volume(i,j)*phi*exp(-rho*t(i));
if N_h(i,j)==0
C(i,j)=0;
end
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TC(i,j)=sum(C(:,j));
%% marginal net benefit
nb(i,j)=TB(i,j)-TC(i,j);
%% Net Benefit
NB2=nb(i,2);
end
end
%% Identify Behavior
if max(xS(end-1,2))>comm_width+w_init
behavior=0; %seaward growth
elseif max(xS(end-1,2))<=comm_width+w_init && xH(end-1,2)-xH(1,2)==0
behavior=3; %hold the line
elseif (xH(end-1,2)-xH(1,2)<0) && Nrate~=0
behavior=6; %slow retreat
elseif (xH(end-1,2)-xH(1,2)<0) && Nrate==0
behavior=9; %retreat
end

%
%

%% Nourishment Efficiency
if Nrate~=0
Eff=efficiency(end-1);
elseif Nrate==0
Eff=NaN;
end
ind=find(w(2:end-1,2)-w_init<=0.5*(w(2,2)-w_init));
halflife=min(t(ind));
%% Shoreline Change
W=xS(end-1,2)-xS(1,2);

%
%% Output Storage
%
N_efficiency_storage(iN)=Eff;
%
NB_storage(iN)=NB2;
%
behavior_storage(iN)=behavior;
% end
% %% find optimum
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% % coordinated
% maxNB=max(NB_storage(:));
% index=find(NB_storage==maxNB);
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% Nrate_star=Nrate_vector(index);
% NB_star=NB_storage(index);
% behavior_star=behavior_storage(index);
% Neff_star=N_efficiency_storage(index);
% PV=5e6;
% comres=0.02;
% rows_along=5000/30;
% TBW=PV*rows_along;
% Nrate_emp=max(0,-7800.23119+0.00015081*TBW+223965*comres);
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PV_comres_sensitivities.m
PV_vec=linspace(1e4,7e6,150);
TBW_vec=PV_vec*5000/30;
comres_vec=linspace(0,0.6,150);
nn=length(PV_vec);
mm=length(comres_vec);
behavior_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
NB2_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
W_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
Eff_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
Nrate_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
%% Main code %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
parfor ii=1:numel(PV_vec)
behavior_vector=zeros(1,mm);
NB2_vector=zeros(1,mm);
W_vector=zeros(1,mm);
Eff_vector=zeros(1,mm);
Nrate_vector=zeros(1,mm);
for jj=1:numel(comres_vec)
PV=PV_vec(ii);
comres=comres_vec(jj);
[behavior,NB2,W,Eff,Nrate]=maincode(PV,comres);
%% Storage %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
behavior_vector(jj)=behavior;
NB2_vector(jj)=NB2;
W_vector(jj)=W;
Eff_vector(jj)=Eff;
Nrate_vector(jj)=Nrate;
end
behavior_storage(ii,:)=behavior_vector;
NB2_storage(ii,:)=NB2_vector;
W_storage(ii,:)=W_vector;
Eff_storage(ii,:)=Eff_vector;
Nrate_storage(ii,:)=Nrate_vector;
end
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A4.3 Chapter 3
base_code_timesens.m
% function
[NB_star,tcritg_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_code_time
sens(alpha2,rows_cross,Nrate1,Nrate2,L1,L2,t_crit_n_up,t_crit_n_down,t_crit_g_up)
function
[NB_star,tcritg_star,tcritn_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_
code_timesens(phi_g,gamma)
% function
[NB_star,tcritg_star,tcritn_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_
code_timesens(alpha2,rows_cross)
% function
[NB_star,tcritg_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_code_time
sens(rows_cross)
tt=linspace(0,99,100); %197
tcritg_vec=[tt NaN];
mm=numel(tcritg_vec);
tcritn_vector=linspace(0,99,100); %197
tcritn_vec=[tcritn_vector NaN];
kk=numel(tcritn_vec);
NB_storage=NaN(mm,kk); %(1,mm);
behavior_storage=NaN(mm,kk); %(1,mm);
decision_storage=NaN(mm,kk); %(1,mm);
shorelinechange_storage=NaN(mm,kk); %(1,mm);
parfor ii=1:numel(tcritg_vec)
NB_vec=zeros(1,kk);
behavior_vec=zeros(1,kk);
decision_vec=zeros(1,kk);
shorelinechange_vec=zeros(1,kk);
Nh_final_vec=zeros(1,kk);
for in=1:numel(tcritn_vec)
%% Input Physical Parameters %%
lot_size=30;
w_init=30;
beta=0.5; %beach width hedonic parameter
alpha1=1e6/(w_init^beta);
alpha2=277519; %0.1e6/(w_init^beta);
s=[300 300]; %alongshore compartment length (m)
rows_along=s(2)/lot_size;
rows_cross=38; %# of cross-shore proeprty rows

187

%

%

%

properties_total=rows_cross*rows_along;
comm_width=rows_cross*lot_size; %initial Community Width (m)
psi=0.2;
D=16; %depth of closure (m)
gamma=2; %erosion rate (m/yr)
d=500000; %alongshore flux coeff (m^2/yr)
K=2000; %cross-shore flux coeff (m^2/yr)
phi_n=5; %sand cost ($/m^3)
Nrate1=8415; %Nourishment Rate (m^3/yr)
Nrate2=18614; %Nourishment Rate (m^3/yr)
phi_g=100000; %groin cost ($/m)
rho=0.03; %discount rate
nu=0; %beach width decline beyond max threshold
theta_eq=0.025; %equilibrium shoreface slope
deg=75; %breaking wave angle
rad=deg*pi/180;
H=1; %Wave Height (m)
T=10; %Wave Period (s)
qin=d*(H^(5/2))*cos(rad)*sin(rad);
k1=0;
k2=0;
L1=135;
L2=100;
t_crit_g_up=0; %24;
t_crit_g_down=tcritg_vec(ii); %time of groin construction downdrift
t_crit_n_up=0; %61; %time of first nourishment downdrift
t_crit_n_down=tcritn_vec(in); %time of first nourishment downdrift
%% Computational Parameters %%
tmax=100; dt=0.05; t=0:dt:tmax; n=length(t);
Smax=2; ds=1; S=1:ds:Smax; m=length(S);
A1=alpha1*rho; A2=alpha2*rho;

L=zeros(1,m); theta=zeros(n,m); qL=NaN(n,m); qC=zeros(n,m); fS=zeros(n,m);
fT=zeros(n,m);
xS=zeros(n,m); xT=zeros(n,m); xH=zeros(n,m); w=zeros(n,m);
B=zeros(n,m); B_disc=zeros(n,m); TB=zeros(n,m);
C=zeros(n,m); TC=zeros(n,m);
nb=NaN(n,m); N_h=zeros(n,m);
volume=zeros(n,m); nE=zeros(n,m); Vtotal=zeros(n,m);
TQL_out=zeros(1,n); TQC_out=zeros(1,n); TQ_out=zeros(1,n);
share1=NaN(1); share2=NaN(1);
behavior=NaN(1); decision=NaN(1);
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NB1=NaN(1); NB2=NaN(1); TNB=NaN(1);
time_groin=NaN(1); time_drown=NaN(1); w_crit_g=NaN(1); Nh_crit=NaN(1);
shoreline_change=NaN(1);
%% Initial Conditions %%
xS(1,:)=comm_width+w_init;
xT(1,:)=xS(1,:)+(D/theta_eq);
xH(1,:)=comm_width;
N_h(1,:)=rows_cross;
w(1,:)=xS(1,:)-xH(1,:);
C(1,1)=phi_g*L1;

%

%% Main Code %%
for i=1:n-1
for j=1:m
%% Groin Lengths
L(:,1)=L1;
%% Nourishment Initiation + Volume
if t(i)>=t_crit_n_up
volume(i,1)=Nrate1;
else
volume(i,1)=0;
end
if t(i)>=t_crit_n_down
volume(i,2)=Nrate2;
else
volume(i,2)=0;
end
Vtotal(i+1,2)=Vtotal(i,2)+volume(i,2);

%% Fluxes (Along/Cross-shore) and Shoreface Dynamics
if xS(i,2)<=comm_width+L(1) && xS(i,1)<=comm_width+L(1) && L(1)~=0
qL(i,1)=qin*((xS(i,1)-xH(i,1))./L(1));
elseif xS(i,2)>comm_width+L(1) || xS(i,1)>comm_width+L(1) || L(1)==0
qL(i,1)=d*(H^(5/2))*cos(rad-atan((xS(i,1)xS(i,2))/(0.5*s(1)+0.5*s(2))))*sin(rad-atan((xS(i,1)-xS(i,2))/(0.5*s(1)+0.5*s(2))));
end
if xS(i,2)<=comm_width+L(2) && L(2)~=0 %(xS(i,2)-xH(i,2))<=L(2) &&
(xS(i,3)-xH(i,3))<=L(2) && L(2)~=0
qL(i,2)=qL(i,1)*((xS(i,2)-xH(i,2))./L(2));
elseif xS(i,2)>comm_width+L(2) || L(2)==0 %(xS(i,2)-xH(i,2))>L(2) ||
(xS(i,3)-xH(i,3))>L(2) || L(2)==0
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qL(i,2)=qin; %d*cos(rad-atan((xS(i,2)xS(i,3))/(0.5*s(2)+0.5*s(3))))*sin(rad-atan((xS(i,2)-xS(i,3))/(0.5*s(2)+0.5*s(3))));
end
theta(i,j)=D/(xT(i,j)-xS(i,j)); %theta(i,1)=D/(xT(i,1)-xS(i,1));
theta(i,m)=D/(xT(i,m)-xS(i,m));
qC(i,j)=4*s(j)*K*(theta(i,j)-theta_eq); %qC(i,1)=4*s*K*(theta(i,1)-theta_eq);
qC(i,m)=4*s*K*(theta(i,m)-theta_eq);
%% ODE's ((2*d/(s^2))*(xS(i,m)-2*xS(i,1)+xS(i,2)))-(4*K*(theta(i,1)theta_eq)/D)
fT(i,j)=(4*K*(theta(i,j)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma; %fT(i,1)=(4*K*(theta(i,1)theta_eq)/D)-gamma; fT(i,m)=(4*K*(theta(i,m)-theta_eq)/D)-gamma;
fS(i,1)=((2/(D*s(1)))*(qin-qL(i,1)))-(4*K*(theta(i,1)-theta_eq)/D)gamma+((2*volume(i,1))/(D*s(1))); %((2/(D*s(1)))*(qL(i,3)-qL(i,1)))-(4*K*(theta(i,1)theta_eq)/D)-gamma; %
fS(i,2)=((2/(D*s(2)))*(qL(i,1)-qL(i,2)))-(4*K*(theta(i,2)-theta_eq)/D)gamma+((2*volume(i,2))/(D*s(2)));
%% Numerical Approximations
xT(i+1,j)=xT(i,j)+dt*fT(i,j); %xT(i+1,m)=xT(i,m)+dt*fT(i,m);
if xS(i,j)<=lot_size
volume(i,j)=0; volume(i+1,j)=0; N_h(i,j)=0; xH(i,j)=0; N_h(i+1,j)=0;
xH(i+1,j)=0; %xS(i,j)=0; xS(i+1,j)=0;
elseif xS(i,j)<=xH(i,j)+5
xH(i+1,j)=xH(i,j)-lot_size; N_h(i+1,j)=N_h(i,j)-1;
else
xH(i+1,j)=xH(i,j);
end
%
if volume(i,1)~=0
%
xS(i+1,1)=xS(i,1)+xN1;
%
elseif volume(i,1)==0
%
xS(i+1,1)=xS(i,1)+dt*fS(i,1);
%
end
%
if volume(i,2)~=0
%
xS(i+1,2)=xS(i,2)+xN2;
%
elseif volume(i,2)==0
%
xS(i+1,2)=xS(i,2)+dt*fS(i,2);
%
end
%
xS(i+1,3)=xS(i,3)+dt*fS(i,3);
xS(i+1,j)=xS(i,j)+dt*fS(i,j);
w(i,j)=xS(i,j)-xH(i,j); w(i,m)=xS(i,m)-xH(i,m);
%% Housing Lines
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N_h(i,j)=xH(i,j)/lot_size; N_h(i,m)=xH(i,m)/lot_size;
%% Groin Construction
if t(i)>=t_crit_g_up
L(1)=L1;
end
if t(i)>=t_crit_g_down
L(2)=L2;
end
if t(i)==t_crit_g_down && L2~=0 && volume(i,2)==0
C(i,2)=phi_g*L(2)*exp(-rho*t(i));
elseif t(i)~=t_crit_g_down && volume(i,2)~=0
C(i,2)=(volume(i,2)*phi_n)*exp(-rho*t(i));
elseif t(i)~=t_crit_g_down && volume(i,2)==0
C(i,2)=0;
elseif t(i)==t_crit_g_down && L2~=0 && volume(i,2)~=0
C(i,2)=(phi_g*L(2)+volume(i,j)*phi_n)*exp(-rho*t(i));
elseif t(i)~=t_crit_g_down && L2~=0 && volume(i,2)==0
C(i,2)=0;
end
if isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down>0
w_crit_g=w(t_crit_g_down/dt,2);
Nh_crit=rows_cross-N_h(t_crit_g_down/dt,2);
elseif t_crit_g_down==0
w_crit_g=w(1,2);
Nh_crit=rows_cross-N_h(1,2);
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==1
w_crit_g=NaN;
Nh_crit=NaN;
end
%% Benefit
B(i,1)=rows_along.*A1.*((w(i,1)).^beta)*((N_h(i,1)).^psi);
B(i,2)=rows_along.*A2.*((w(i,2)).^beta)*((N_h(i,2)).^psi);
%
if xS(i,2)>2
%
B(i,2)=rows_along.*A2.*((w(i,2)).^beta);
%
elseif xS(i,2)<=2
%
B(i,2)=0;
%
end
B_disc(i,j)=B(i,j)*exp(-rho*t(i)); %B_disc(i,m)=B(i,m)*exp(-rho*t(i));
TB(i,j)=(dt/3)*(B_disc(1,j)+4*(sum(B_disc(2:2:end,j)))+2*sum(B_disc(2:1:end,j))+B_di
sc(end,j));
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%TB(i,m)=(dt/3)*(B_disc(1,m)+4*(sum(B_disc(2:2:end,m)))+2*sum(B_disc(2:1:end,m)
)+B_disc(end,m));
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

%
%
%

%% Cost
C(i,j)=(c+volume(i,j)*phi_n)*exp(-rho*t(i));
C(i,m)=(c+volume(i,m)*phi_n)*exp(-rho*t(i));
if volume(i,j)==0
C(i,j)=0;
end
if volume(i,m)==0
C(i,m)=0;
end
if N_h(i,j)==0
C(i,j)=0;
end
if N_h(i,m)==0
C(i,m)=0;
end
TC(i,j)=sum(C(:,j)); %TC(i,m)=sum(C(:,m));
%% marginal net benefit
nb(i,j)=TB(i,j)-TC(i,j); %nb(i,m)=TB(i,m)-TC(i,m);
if w_crit_g>L(2)
nb(i,2)=NaN;
end
%% Net Benefit
NB1=nb(end-1,1); NB2=nb(end-1,2); TNB=NB1+NB2;
share1=NB1/TNB; share2=NB2/TNB;

L(2)~=0)

%% behavior determination
if xS(end-1,2)>xS(1,2) && (Nrate2~=0 || L(2)~=0)
behavior=0;
elseif xS(end-1,2)<=xS(1,2) && N_h(end-1,2)==N_h(1,2) && (Nrate2~=0 ||

behavior=1;
elseif N_h(end-1,2)<N_h(1,2) && (isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 ||
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0)
behavior=2;
elseif N_h(end-1,2)<N_h(1,2) && isnan(t_crit_g_down)==1 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==1
behavior=3;
end
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%% decision determination
if isnan(t_crit_g_down)==1 && isnan(t_crit_n_down)==1
decision=0; %no groin; no nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down==0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==1
decision=1; %initial groin; no nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down~=0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==1
decision=2; %delayed groin; no nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==1 && isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 &&
t_crit_n_down==0
decision=3; %no groin; initial nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down==0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 && t_crit_n_down==0
decision=4; %initial groin; initial nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down~=0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 && t_crit_n_down==0
decision=5; %delayed groin; initial nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==1 && isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 &&
t_crit_n_down~=0
decision=6; %no groin; delayed nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down==0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 && t_crit_n_down~=0
decision=7; %initial groin; delayed nourishment
elseif isnan(t_crit_g_down)==0 && t_crit_g_down~=0 &&
isnan(t_crit_n_down)==0 && t_crit_n_down~=0
decision=8; %delayed groin; delayed nourishment
end
shoreline_change=(xS(end-1,2)-xS(1,2))./tmax;
end
end
NB_vec(in)=nb(end-1,2);
behavior_vec(in)=behavior;
decision_vec(in)=decision;
shorelinechange_vec(in)=shoreline_change;
Nh_final_vec(in)=N_h(end-1,2);
end
NB_storage(ii,:)=NB_vec; %NB_storage(ii)=nb(end-1,2);
behavior_storage(ii,:)=behavior_vec; %behavior_storage(ii)=behavior;
decision_storage(ii,:)=decision_vec; %decision_storage(ii)=decision;
shorelinechange_storage(ii,:)=shorelinechange_vec;
%shorelinechange_storage(ii)=shoreline_change;
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end
NB_star=max(NB_storage(:));
[row,col]=find(NB_storage==NB_star); %ind=find(NB_storage==NB_star);
% if max(col)~=101 || max(row)~=101
tcritg_star=tcritg_vec(row); %tcritg_star=tcritg_vec(ind);
tcritn_star=tcritn_vec(col);
behavior_star=behavior_storage(row,col); %behavior_star=behavior_storage(ind);
decision_star=decision_storage(row,col); %decision_star=decision_storage(ind);
shoreline_change_star=shorelinechange_storage(row,col);
%shoreline_change_star=shorelinechange_storage(ind);
% elseif max(col)==101 && max(row)==101
% Nh_final_star=0;
% tcritg_star=NaN;
% tcritn_star=NaN;
% behavior_star=max(max(behavior_storage(row,col)));
% decision_star=min(min(decision_storage(row,col)));
% shoreline_change_star=shorelinechange_storage(max(row),max(col));
% end
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alpha2_Nh2_sensitivities.m
tic
alpha2_vec=linspace((1e3)/(30^0.5),(5e6)/(30^0.5),20);
Nh2_vec=linspace(1,120,20);
nn=length(alpha2_vec);
mm=length(Nh2_vec);
NBmax_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
tcritg_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
tcritn_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
behavior_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
decision_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
shoreline_change_storage=zeros(nn,mm);
%% Main code %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for ii=1:numel(alpha2_vec)
NBmax_vector=zeros(1,mm);
tcritg_vector=zeros(1,mm);
tcritn_vector=zeros(1,mm);
behavior_vector=zeros(1,mm);
decision_vector=zeros(1,mm);
shoreline_change_vector=zeros(1,mm);
for jj=1:numel(Nh2_vec)
alpha2=alpha2_vec(ii);
rows_cross=Nh2_vec(jj);
[NB_star,tcritg_star,tcritn_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_
code_timesens(alpha2,rows_cross);
%% Storage %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NBmax_vector(jj)=NB_star(end);
tcritg_vector(jj)=tcritg_star(end);
tcritn_vector(jj)=tcritn_star(end);
behavior_vector(jj)=behavior_star(end);
decision_vector(jj)=decision_star(end);
shoreline_change_vector(jj)=shoreline_change_star(end);
end
NBmax_storage(ii,:)=NBmax_vector;
tcritg_storage(ii,:)=tcritg_vector;
tcritn_storage(ii,:)=tcritn_vector;
behavior_storage(ii,:)=behavior_vector;
decision_storage(ii,:)=decision_vector;
shoreline_change_storage(ii,:)=shoreline_change_vector;
end
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%% figures
%% save data
time_elapsed=toc;
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Nh2_sensitivites.m
tic
Nh2_vec=linspace(1,120,120);
nn=length(Nh2_vec);
NBmax_storage=zeros(1,nn);
tcritg_storage=zeros(1,nn);
behavior_storage=zeros(1,nn);
decision_storage=zeros(1,nn);
shoreline_change_storage=zeros(1,nn);
%% Main code %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for jj=1:numel(Nh2_vec)
rows_cross=Nh2_vec(jj);
[NB_star,tcritg_star,behavior_star,decision_star,shoreline_change_star]=base_code_time
sens(rows_cross);
%% Storage %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
NBmax_storage(jj)=NB_star(end);
tcritg_storage(jj)=tcritg_star(end);
behavior_storage(jj)=behavior_star(end);
decision_storage(jj)=decision_star(end);
shoreline_change_storage(jj)=shoreline_change_star(end);
end
%% save data
time_elapsed=toc;
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